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Since the advent of the Human Genome Project in 1989, the ethical, legal, and social implications
inherent in future genetic science and its applications have worried researchers and scholars in law
and ethics. Concern that the results of genetic testing might be used to discriminate against
particular individuals and groups of individuals has been paramount, prompting calls for specific
legislation to protect against genetic discrimination. Against this backdrop we sought to investigate
instances of genetic discrimination in Canadian legal decisions. We searched Canadian court and
administrative tribunal decisions, using the key words “genetic predisposition” and its cognates, and
found none that took up the issue of genetic discrimination. However, in 468 decisions, “genetic
predisposition” was used by courts and tribunals when describing the causal origins of health related
conditions. Genetic predisposition was cited with respect to numerous health conditions, and in
various areas of law, in particular criminal, family, workers’ compensation, and tort. In several
criminal law decisions, genetic predisposition served to explain the origin of a mental health
condition in addressing the issue of criminal responsibility. The predominant use in family law was in
describing a child’s health condition in crown wardship and youth protection proceedings. In
workers’ compensation and tort, genetic predisposition was used to argue whether the claimant’s
condition was inherited rather than related to the workplace or the negligence of the defendant.
Genetic predisposition, when used to argue the issue of disease causation on a balance of
probabilities, reflects “geneticization”: the tendency to describe the underlying basis of health and
disease as genetic. Geneticization, like genetic discrimination, can be problematic. Specifically, both
may exaggerate the extent to which genetic information is exceptional and determinative of health
and disease outcomes. Also, geneticization, like genetic discrimination, may marginalize people on a
perceived genetic basis.
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UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF “GENETIC
PREDISPOSITION” IN CANADIAN LEGAL DECISIONS
Mark Pioro, Roxanne Mykitiuk, Lilith Finkler & Jeff
Nisker*
Since the advent of the Human Genome Project in
1989, the ethical, legal, and social implications inherent in future genetic science and its applications
have worried researchers and scholars in law and
ethics. Concern that the results of genetic testing
might be used to discriminate against particular individuals and groups of individuals has been paramount, prompting calls for specific legislation to
protect against genetic discrimination. Against this
backdrop we sought to investigate instances of genetic discrimination in Canadian legal decisions. We
searched Canadian court and administrative tribunal
decisions, using the key words “genetic predisposition” and its cognates, and found none that took up
the issue of genetic discrimination. However, in 468
decisions, “genetic predisposition” was used by
courts and tribunals when describing the causal origins of health related conditions. Genetic predisposition was cited with respect to numerous health
conditions, and in various areas of law, in particular
criminal, family, workers’ compensation, and tort.
In several criminal law decisions, genetic predisposition served to explain the origin of a mental health
condition in addressing the issue of criminal responsibility. The predominant use in family law was in
describing a child’s health condition in crown

Depuis la mise en place du « Projet génome humain
» en 1989, les implications éthiques, légales et sociales inhérentes au futur de la génétique et de ses
applications ont soulevé une certaine inquiétude
chez les chercheurs et spécialistes de l’éthique et du
droit. Ces appréhensions graves sur le fait que les
résultats de tests génétiques puissent être utilisés
pour discriminer certains individus ou groupes de
personnes en ont incité plusieurs à demander qu’on
légifère de façon spécifique afin de contrer la discrimination génétique. C’est dans ce contexte que
nous avons voulu enquêter sur les cas de discrimination génétique dans les décisions légales canadiennes. Nous avons effectué nos recherches parmi les
décisions des cours et tribunaux administratifs canadiens, utilisant les mots-clés « prédisposition génétique » et leurs parents, mais n’avons trouvé
aucune décision abordant la discrimination génétique. Cependant, « prédisposition génétique » fut
utilisé dans 468 décisions pour décrire les causes
d’une grande variété de problèmes de santé, et ce
dans divers domaines du droit, en particulier le droit
criminel, de la famille, la responsabilité extracontractuelle et l’indemnisation de travailleurs.
Dans plusieurs décisions de droit criminel, la prédisposition génétique fut utilisée comme explication
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wardship and youth protection proceedings. In
workers’ compensation and tort, genetic predisposition was used to argue whether the claimant’s condition was inherited rather than related to the workplace or the negligence of the defendant. Genetic
predisposition, when used to argue the issue of disease causation on a balance of probabilities, reflects
“geneticization”: the tendency to describe the underlying basis of health and disease as genetic. Geneticization, like genetic discrimination, can be problematic. Specifically, both may exaggerate the extent to which genetic information is exceptional and
determinative of health and disease outcomes. Also,
geneticization, like genetic discrimination, may
marginalize people on a perceived genetic basis.
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pour la source de troubles de santé mentale lors de
la détermination de la responsabilité criminelle.
L’usage le plus courant en droit de la famille fut
pour décrire l’état de santé d’un enfant dans le cadre
de procédures touchant la tutelle de l’état et la protection de la jeunesse. Dans le cas de la responsabilité extra-contractuelle et l’indemnisation de travailleurs, la prédisposition génétique fut utilisée dans
des cas où l’on voulait déterminer si la condition
d’un demandeur lui avait été transmise ou si elle
était plutôt liée au lieu de travail ou à la négligence
du défendeur. La prédisposition génétique,
lorsqu’utilisée dans le cadre d’arguments sur la causalité d’une maladie sur la balance des probabilités,
reflète la « génétisation » : la tendance à décrire
l’origine de la maladie et de l’état de santé comme
étant génétique. Or, la génétisation, tout comme la
discrimination génétique, peut devenir problématique. Toutes deux peuvent exagérer l’étendue du
caractère distinctif et déterminatif de l’état de santé
qu’ont les renseignements génétiques. De plus, la
génétisation et la discrimination génétique peuvent
marginaliser certaines personnes sur la base d’une
perception de condition génétique.
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Introduction
Since the Human Genome Project set out in 1989 to map and sequence
the human genome,1 scholars have considered the ethical, legal and social
implications of the Project.2 A particular concern identified early was that of
“genetic discrimination”, which has been defined as “the denial of rights,
privileges or opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-based diagnostic and prognostic tests.”3 Genetic discrimination has
been anticipated in the employment and insurance contexts in particular.4 In
Canada, where individuals receive publicly-funded health care, discrimination has been thought more likely to occur in relation to disability5 or life in-

1

James D Watson, “The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future” (1990)
248:4951 Science 44.
2
See e.g. Michael S Yesley, “What’s ELSI Got to Do with It? Bioethics and the
Human Genome Project” (2008) 27:1 New Genet Soc 1; George J Annas, “At
Law: Who’s Afraid of the Human Genome?” (1989) 19 Hastings Cent Rep 19:4;
Roxanne Mykitiuk & Steven Penney, “Screening for Deficits: The Legal and
Ethical Implications of Genetic Screening and Testing to Reduce Health Care
Budgets” (1995) 3 Health LJ 235; Eric T Juengst, “Priorities in Professional Ethics
and Social Policy for Human Genetics” (1991) 266:13 JAMA 1835; Lori B
Andrews et al, eds, Assessing Genetic Risks: Implications for Health and Social
Policy (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1994).
3
Larry Gostin, “Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers” (1991) 17:1&2 Am J L & Med
109 at 110.
4
See e.g. ibid; Mark A Rothstein, “Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act” (1992) 29:1 Hous L Rev 23; Marvin R
Natowicz, Jane K Alper & Joseph S Alper, “Genetic Discrimination and the Law”
(1992) 50:3 Am J Hum Genet 465; Jill Gaulding, “Race, Sex, and Genetic
Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair?” (1994) 80 Cornell L Rev 1646; C Lee,
“Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential for Genetic Discrimination by the
Health Insurance Industry” (1993) 13:1 Pace L Rev 189; RJ McMurray et al, “Use
of Genetic Testing by Employers” (1991) 266:13 JAMA 1827; Kathy L Hudson et
al, “Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform”
(1995) 270:5235 Science 391.
5
Trudo Lemmens, “Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance: Should
We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?” (2000) 45:2 McGill LJ 347 at 352-53.
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surance.6 We initially sought to examine Canadian case law relating to genetic discrimination, but broadened our study to explore whether and how the
language and knowledge of genetics are being used in Canadian court and
tribunal decisions. Our focus was on how courts and tribunals were using, if
at all, genetic information relating to disease causation or a health-related
condition in question, rather than other factors (for example, genetic kinship). It is information of this kind that has begun to be produced by research
and reported in the scientific literature,7 and which has the potential to lead
to genetic discrimination.8 Understanding how, and in what contexts, courts
and administrative tribunals use genetic language and knowledge can provide
insight into the legal meaning of personal genetic information as well as the
processes of legal decision making through which genetic information is
used and possibly, abused.
This paper argues that adversarial legal processes, in their use of genetic
concepts of disease causation, contribute to and reflect the geneticization of
health and disease, with “disorders, behaviours and physiological variations
defined, at least in part, as genetic in origin.”9 This occurs because scientific
uncertainty in light of the multiple risk factors and mechanisms of disease,
combined with the general principle that the burden of proof rests with one
6

7

8

9

Ibid; Bartha M Knoppers & Yann Joly, “Physicians, Genetics and Life Insurance”
(2004) 170:9 CMAJ 1421.
See e.g. Marcy E MacDonald et al, “A Novel Gene Containing a Trinucleotide
Repeat that Is Expanded and Unstable on Huntington’s Disease Chromosomes”
(1993) 72:6 Cell 971; Richard Wooster et al, “Identification of the Breast Cancer
Susceptibility Gene BRCA2” (1995) 378:6559 Nature 789.
Yvonne Bombard et al, “Perceptions of Genetic Discrimination among People at
Risk for Huntington’s Disease: A Cross Sectional Survey” (2009) 338:b2175
BMJ; Hudson et al, supra note 4; Paul R Billings et al, “Discrimination as a
Consequence of Genetic Testing” (1992) 50 Am J Hum Genet 476; S Taylor et al,
“Investigating Genetic Discrimination in Australia: A Large-scale Survey of
Clinical Genetics Clients” (2008) 74:1 Clin Genet 20. See also Steve E
Humphries, Paul M Ridker & Philippa J Talmud, “Genetic Testing for
Cardiovascular Disease Susceptibility: A Useful Clinical Management Tool or
Possible Misinformation?” (2004) 24:4 Arterioscler Thromb Vasc Biol 628 at
628-29, 634; Ine Van Hoyweghen, Klasien Horstman & Rita Schepers, “Genetic
‘Risk Carriers’ and Lifestyle ‘Risk Takers’. Which Risks Deserve our Legal
Protection in Insurance?” (2007) 15:3 Health Care Anal 179 (both discussing the
predictive and practical limits of genetic factors of disease in relation to nongenetic factors).
Abby Lippman, “Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and
Reinforcing Inequities” (1991) 17:2 Am J L & Med 15 at 19.
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of the parties on a balance of probabilities, render it sufficient (and economical) to resolve the issue of disease causation without thoroughly examining
the genesis of the condition in question. The resolution of claims in this way
leaves open the possibility that genetics will stand in for “hidden causes”10 of
disease. For example, in a personal injury case where a condition is found to
be compensable, ideas of genetic susceptibility may serve to differentiate individuals subject to common exposures where only some become or remain
ill.11 Likewise, where the required causal link is found not to exist, the origin
of the condition may conveniently be ascribed to genetic predisposition itself.12 While genetic discrimination was not at issue in any of the decisions
we surveyed, our findings nonetheless raise concern. This is because geneticization, like genetic discrimination, may reflect a problematic view of the
extent to which genetic information is exceptional, and determinative of
health and disease outcomes.13 The next section provides background on legal and policy responses to the threat of genetic discrimination as well as
how the scope of this paper was set. The paper then sets out the research
methodology used to obtain and analyze the sample of decisions it considers.
It first presents the results as an overview of the sample of decisions retrieved. Specifically, decisions are catalogued by jurisdiction, area of law,
and the clinical condition in respect of which “genetic predisposition” is being cited. This overview sets the stage for classification of the various ways
in which reference to genetic predisposition resolves different legal issues.
The results are then discussed, particularly with regards to the way in which
legal decision making may contribute to the geneticization of health and disease. Finally, this paper comments on the implications of geneticization in
legal decision making from a disability rights perspective.

10

Michel Morange, The Misunderstood Gene (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001) at 12.
11
See e.g. Kolokathis et Industries Maintenance Empire (22 January 2002), 11477471-9904 at para 37, online: QCCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> [Kolokathis].
12
See e.g. Decision no 2008-1082 (10 December 2008), 2008 CanLII 85217, online:
AWCAC <www.appealscommission.ab.ca>; Decision no 2004-05655 (27
October 2004), 2004 CanLII 71273, online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca >.
13
Péter Kakuk, “Genetic Information in the Age of Genohype” (2006) 9:3 Med
Health Care Philos 325 at 335. See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy
Nelkin, “The Jurisprudence of Genetics” (1992) 45:2 Vand L Rev 313 (discussing
genetic essentialism at 320-21); Susan M Wolf, “Beyond ‘Genetic
Discrimination’: Toward the Broader Harm of Geneticism” (1995) 23:4 JL Med &
Ethics 345 (Wolf goes farther by arguing that even when scientifically accurate,
describing people in terms of genetic is still problematic, at 350).
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Background

Individuals14 and government agencies15 have proposed a variety of legislative and policy responses to genetic discrimination and other ethical concerns stemming from developments in human genetics. International bodies
have advocated for a use of genetic data that respects human rights and dignity.16 A majority of American states have restricted use of an individual’s
genetic information by health insurers and employers.17 At the federal level,
the American Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) of
200818 prohibits discrimination in employment and health insurance based on
genetic information. Disability discrimination and health information privacy

14

See e.g. Hudson et al, supra note 4; Karen Eltis, “Genetic Determinism and
Discrimination: A Call to Re-Orient Prevailing Human Rights Discourse to Better
Comport with the Public Implications of Individual Genetic Testing” (2007) 35:2
JL Med & Ethics 282; Bartha Maria Knoppers, “Overview of Law and Policy
Challenges” (December 2005) 66 La L Rev 21.
15
See e.g. Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Genetic Testing and Privacy” (Ottawa:
PCC, 1995), online: PCC <www.priv.gc.ca/information/02_05_11_e.pdf>; United
Kingdom, Department of Health, “Our Inheritance, Our Future: Realising the
Potential of Genetics in the NHS” (London: DH, 2003), online: Department of
Health
<www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/
documents/digitalasset/dh_4019239.pdf>; United States, Department of Health &
Human Services, U.S. System of Oversight of Genetic Testing: A Response to the
Charge of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Report of the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (Bethesda, SACGHS,
2008), online: DHHS <oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs_ oversight_
report.pdf>.
16
See e.g. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,
UNESCO (11 November 1997); International Declaration on Human Genetic
Data, UNESCO (16 October 2003); Resolution 2004/9 on Genetic Privacy and
Non-discrimination, E/RES/2004/9, ECOSOC (21 July 2004).
17
National Conference of State Legislatures, “Genetics and Health Insurance State
Anti-Discrimination Laws” (January 2008), online: NCLS <www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/health/genetic-nondiscrimination-in-health-insurance-laws.aspx>;
National Conference of State Legislatures, “Genetic Employment Laws” (January
2008), online: NCLS <www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/genetic-employmentlaws.aspx>.
18
Pub L 110-233, 122 Stat 881.
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legislation also provides some protection against genetic discrimination.19 In
Europe, Article 11 of the EU Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine20 prohibits genetic discrimination and Article 12 restricts the use of genetic testing to health-related purposes. These regulations in the United
States and Europe are implemented in a variety of national instruments pertaining to health information privacy and non-discrimination.21 Aside from
preventing and remedying genetic discrimination, these measures may allay
fear of undergoing genetic tests based on concern that discrimination would
result.22 In Canada, no formal legislative response has been made regarding
genetic discrimination. Scholars and agencies have, however, contemplated
various courses of action including strengthening existing privacy and human
rights legislation, and creating separate legislation to address the issue.23

19

National Human Genome Research Institute, “Existing Federal Anti-Discrimination
Laws and How They Apply to Genetics” (28 February 2012), online: NHGRI
<www.genome.gov/12513979>; Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §
12101 (1990); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub L
104-191, 110 Stat 1936.
20
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, 4 April 1997, 2137 UNTS 171, Eur TS164.
21
Nancy J King, Sukanya Pillay & Gail A Lasprogata, “Workplace Privacy and
Discrimination Issues Related to Genetic Data: A Comparative Law Study of the
European Union and the United States” (2006) 43:1 Am Bus LJ 79 at 82-83.
22
See Louise A Keogh et al, “Is Uptake of Genetic Testing for Colorectal Cancer
Influenced by Knowledge of Insurance Implications?” (2009) 191:5 Med J Aust
255.
23
See e.g. Trudo Lemmens, Daryl Pullman & Rebecca Rodal, Genome Canada,
“Revisiting Genetic Discrimination Issues in 2010: Policy Options for Canada”,
Policy Brief No. 2, (Ottawa: GPS, 2010), online: Genome Canada
<www.genomecanada.ca/medias/pdf/en/GPS-Policy-Directions-Brief-2-EN.pdf>;
Trudo Lemmens, Mireille Lacroix & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Reading the Future?:
Legal and Ethical Challenges of Predictive Genetic Testing (Montréal: Les
Éditions Thémis, 2005); Jo Ann Watton, “Fighting Genetic Discrimination in
Canada: A New Coalition Takes Up the Cause” (2008) 22:6 GeneWatch 21,
online: Council For Responsible Genetics <www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.
org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=229>; Québec, Conseil de la santé
et du bien-être, “La santé et le bien-être à l’ère de l’information génétique: enjeux
individuels et sociaux à gérer” (Québec: Conseil de la santé et du bien-être, 2001),
online: FQRSC <www.fqrsc.gouv.qc.ca/upload/editeur/etique/avissante bienetre.
pdf>; Privacy Commissioner of Canada, supra note 15; Ontario Law Reform
Commission, “Report on Genetic Testing” (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1996),
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Against this backdrop of concern about genetic discrimination, we investigated whether Canadian case law since the inception of the Human Genome
Project indicates a record of allegations of genetic discrimination.24 We performed Quicklaw searches of the “All Canadian Court Cases” and “All
Boards and Tribunals” databases for “genetic discrimination” as a phrase,
which revealed no results. A CanLii search also produced no results. We
then searched both “genetic” and “discrimination” separately and found no
cases that raised the issue of genetic discrimination. We also reviewed the
academic literature addressing genetic discrimination in Canada and found
two noteworthy cases not identified from our keyword search. Although these cases do not discuss genetic discrimination as an issue, they provide background on how Canadian law might approach claims of genetic discrimination.
The 1990 Superior Court of Québec decision in Audet v IndustrielleAlliance25 concerned a life insurance policy-holder who died in an automobile collision. His widow claimed benefits under the policy, but the company
refused to pay having discovered that the insured had a genetic condition;
Steinert disease (a type of muscular dystrophy transmitted in an autosomal
dominant pattern). The insured in applying for coverage had denied having
any physical or mental anomalies. The court decided in favour of the insurance company and declared the insurance policy void, holding that even
though the insured was almost completely asymptomatic, the condition constituted an anomaly and the insured made a false declaration. The facts of
this case involve what could be described as genetic discrimination on the
part of the insurer, as it sought to deny coverage on the basis of the claimant’s genetic condition.
online: Osgoode Hall Law Library <ia700601.us.archive.org/5/items/
reportongenetict00onta/reportongenetict00onta.pdf>; Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee, “Protecting Privacy in the Age of Genetic Information”
(Ottawa: CBAC, August 2004), online: Government of Canada Publications
<publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/Iu44-19-2004E.pdf> .
24
See Roxanne Mykitiuk et al, “The Potential for Misusing ‘Genetic Predisposition’
in Canadian Courts and Tribunals” (2011) 183:14 CMAJ 1601 [Mykitiuk et al,
“The Potential for Misusing”]. This 2011 CMAJ study is based on the same
comprehensive electronic search results as the present paper. The short 2011 study
analyzes references to genetic predisposition in Canadian legal decisions. It
discusses the health conditions cited, the areas of law and legal issues involved,
and the purpose of referring to genetic predisposition.
25
Audet v Industrielle-Alliance, compagnie d’assurance sur la vie, [1990] RRA 500,
[1990] JQ no 2532 (QL) (Qc Sup Ct).
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The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Boisbriand,26 though it does
not involve genetic testing, raised the issue of discrimination on the basis of
perceived or future disability. This decision would be relevant to a claim of
genetic discrimination because the claimant would have to show that he or
she was treated differentially based on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
As genetic discrimination involves denying the rights of a person who may
not have any clinical symptoms of disability at the time, he or she would
have to establish that perceived or future disability is covered by the terms
“disability” or “handicap” contained in Canadian human rights legislation. In
Boisbriand, several employers had refused to hire or retain individuals who,
upon medical examination not involving genetic testing, were shown to have
particular health conditions. These included Crohn’s disease and an anomaly
of the spinal column.27 The conditions, while not affecting functional capability with respect to employment, were nonetheless of concern to the (potential) employers. In defending against allegations of discrimination, the employers argued that a condition not affecting function is not a “handicap” for
the purposes of the Québec Charter of human rights and freedoms.28 The
court, however, took a liberal and purposive approach to interpreting “handicap” based on the quasi-constitutional nature of the Québec Charter and on
the interpretation of human rights legislation throughout Canada. The court
held that “handicap” in the Québec Charter includes perceived disabilities.
Boisbriand has been cited in numerous decisions throughout Canada on the
point that disability in human rights legislation includes perceived disability.29 It does not, however, examine when instances of discrimination based
on perceived disability are justifiable. This issue would be of importance in
the case of refusal to insure or employ someone on the basis of a genetic predisposition or condition.

26

Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v
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27
Ibid at para 3.
28
RSQ, c C-12 [Québec Charter].
29
See e.g. Vetricek v 642518 Canada Inc (Algonquin Careers Academy), 2010 HRTO
757 at para 35, [2010] OHRTD no 697 (QL); Petterson v Gorcak, 2009 BCHRT
439 at para 449, [2009] BCHRTD no 439 (QL); Vantage Contracting Inc v
Marcil, 2004 ABQB 247 at paras 31-32, 27 Alta LR (4th) 262; Tanzos v AZ Bus
Tours Inc, 2007 CHRT 33 at para 32, [2007] DCDP no 33 (QL); New Brunswick
(Human Rights Commission) v Griffin’s Pub Ltd, 2005 NBQB 403 at para 14, 143
ACWS (3d) 899; Evans v Health Care Corp of St John’s, 2003 NLCA 13, 121
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While our search for decisions of Canadian courts and tribunals dealing
with genetic discrimination did not yield any cases directly on point, this
does not suggest that incidents of genetic discrimination do not take place.
Indeed, studies examining the experiences of those who have developed, or
are at risk of developing, a genetic condition have illustrated that discrimination may be occurring.30 Our results demonstrate that within the scope of the
search we conducted (as described below) we could not identify legal cases
of genetic discrimination. Our search did, however, yield legal decisions raising related issues warranting analysis and discussion.
II. Research Methodology
This paper’s methodology is guided by the principles of content analysis,
whereby “a scholar collects a set of documents, such as judicial opinions on
a particular subject, and systematically reads them, recording consistent features of each and drawing inferences about their use and meaning.”31 Doing
so permits researchers to notice and reflect on patterns in jurisprudence that
occur in large numbers of decisions.32 The major limitation of this method
stems from the fact that legal decisions do not contain complete and accurate
facts and reasons arising from the disputes they concern.33 Therefore, it is
generally not well-suited for predicting legal outcomes, and caution is required in attaching meanings to observations made.34 This very quality, however, makes content analysis effective for studying how judges or adjudicators write decisions, and connecting resulting knowledge with “other parts of
the social, political, or economic landscape.”35
The first step of content analysis is selection of cases.36 In order to understand how courts and tribunals understand genetic arguments of disease cau30

The following studies were conducted wholly or partly in Canada: Bombard et al,
supra note 8; Billings et al, supra note 8. See also for an international perspective
Hudson et al, supra note 4; Taylor et al, supra note 8.
31
Mark A Hall & Ronald F Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions” (2008) 96:1 Cal L Rev 63 at 64.
32
Ibid at 78. See also Matthew Herder, “Demythologizing PHOSITA: Applying the
Non-Obviousness Requirement under Canadian Patent Law to Keep Knowledge
in the Public Domain and Foster Innovation” (2009) 47:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 695 at
712.
33
Hall & Wright, supra note 31 at 100.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid at 79.
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sation, we conducted a keyword search for the terms “genetic predisposition”, and cognates “genetic pre-disposition”, “genetically predisposed”,
“genetically pre-disposed”, and “prédisposition génétique” (hereinafter referred to collectively as “genetic predisposition”), on Quicklaw, CanLii, and
jugements.qc.ca.37 We chose these keywords for our search because they
yielded a rich yet manageable sample of decisions to analyze, which contain
the unifying theme of reference to the role of genetic factors in health and
disease. We complemented these results by searching the websites of individual tribunals listed on these services, where available. This yielded additional results, as the decisions of only some tribunals for some years are
available on Quicklaw and CanLii. This was the case with, for example, the
Pension Appeals Board (“PAB”) and the British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal (“BC WCAT”). Duplicate decisions were removed.
We then coded the decisions citing genetic predisposition for numerous
variables, including federal/provincial jurisdiction, area of law, the clinical
condition in respect of which a genetic predisposition was cited, the party reported in the decision as raising the issue of genetic predisposition, the legal
issue which reference to genetic predisposition served to address, and the
outcome of the proceeding. In a large subset of decisions, genetic predisposition was clearly linked with an argument relating to disease causation made
in support of a particular legal outcome. In these decisions we noted whether
reference to genetic predisposition helped or harmed the interests of the parties (in particular the individual with the supposed predisposition): the existence of the predisposition was being affirmed or denied; genetic predisposition was viewed as a sufficient, necessary, or contributory cause of the health
condition; or the reference supported or opposed legally significant disease
causation. We use “legally significant cause” as shorthand to refer to the factual finding concerning disease causation required by the party seeking to
fulfill the burden of proof. For example, the legally significant cause in a
personal injury negligence claim is the negligent conduct of the defendant, in
workers’ compensation it is injury “arising out of and in the course of employment”, and in Crown wardship applications it is the conduct of parents
that supports the Crown’s submissions regarding the best interests of the
child.

37

See Mykitiuk et al, “The Potential for Misusing”, supra note 24 at 1601.
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The final step in content analysis is to analyze the coded cases.38 We employ a descriptive approach, mapping the terrain of legal references to genetic predisposition.39 We provide numerous examples and excerpts from the
decisions in order to allow the reader to interpret the decisions, and to provide more insight than coding and counting can on its own. For example, this
type of description can indicate the weight a decision maker places on statements concerning genetic predisposition in a way that quantitative content
analysis cannot.
III. Overview of Search Results
In this section we briefly survey the results of our search, noting in particular the conditions for which genetic predisposition was cited, the jurisdictions in which the cases took place, and the areas of law involved. A variety
of conditions form the object of reference to genetic predisposition in the results. A few of the interesting features regarding the conditions cited are as
follows. Eighteen decisions contain reference to a genetic predisposition to
two or more distinct clinical conditions. For example, a board medical advisor reporting to a panel of the BC WCAT, noted both that the worker “may
have a genetic pre-disposition”40 to obesity, and with respect to diabetes, that
“there is a genetic pre-disposition to the disorder.”41 Likewise, in Children’s
Aid Society for the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v PL,42 a psychiatrist
witness referred to the possibility that the child may have “a genetic predisposition toward either a mood or anxiety disorder.”43 In total there were 490
references to a particular genetic predisposition made in 468 decisions from
1984 to May 31, 2010.44
Regarding the types of conditions cited, 188 references to genetic predisposition were to musculoskeletal conditions.45 The most cited of this type of
condition was osteoarthritis (40 references), degenerative disc disease (32),
carpal tunnel syndrome (24), and Dupuytren’s contracture (23). Mental
38

See Hall & Wright, supra note 31 at 79.
Ibid at 90.
40
Decision no 2007-03289 (24 October 2007), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>
at 13.
41
Ibid.
42
2007 ONCJ 621, 170 ACWS (3d) 549, [2007] OJ no 5118 (QL) [Manitoulin].
43
Ibid at para 13.
44
See Mykitiuk et al, “The Potential for Misusing”, supra note 24 at 1601-02.
45
See ibid.
39
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health conditions follow, with 100 references in the results. Mental health
conditions include various mood disorders (39), schizophrenia (12), alcoholism (8), and substance abuse (7). Other types of conditions include respiratory (31), cancer (26), neurological (23), allergy (23), dermatological (21), and
others.
Some references were not specific to a particular condition. For example,
in Brewers’ Distributor Ltd v Brewery, Winery & Distillery Workers Union,
Local 300,46 a decision concerning entitlement of employees to extended
health benefits, the labour arbitrator wrote, “what use an employee makes of
this benefit, including whether he or she exhausts it, will vary with the individual’s circumstances, which may include age and disability, as well as
general health, lifestyle, genetic predispositions and many other personal
characteristics.”47
In two decisions, reference to genetic predisposition was to a clearly nonmedical condition. For example, in a decision setting forth reasons for a
criminal sentence, the judge reproduced part of a report of an assessment of
the accused by a psychologist. The report states that the accused “has a penchant for externalizing responsibility, holds grudges, and perceiving himself
as mistreated. This is exacerbated by his drug abuse and a strong genetic
predisposition authored by his father’s side of the family (including mental
disorder and violent criminality).”48 An excerpt of a radio broadcast reported
in a decision concerning a complaint about that broadcast states: “Host: The
topic of a recent conference hosted by Focus on the Family: Freedom from
homosexuality is possible. It’s not a genetic predisposition and it’s not just a
choice.”49
The results break down by jurisdiction as follows: 175 decisions were
from Ontario, 134 from British Columbia, 79 from Québec, 31 from Alberta,
15 federal, 12 from Manitoba, 9 from Newfoundland and Labrador, 8 from

46

[2003] BCCAAA no 217 (QL).
Ibid at para 95. See also Mortimer v Cameron (1992), 32 ACWS (3d) 928, [1992]
OJ no 764 (QL) (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [cited to QL] (referring to “genetic
predisposition to a particular disease” as one factor determining average Canadian
male mortality in the context of calculating damages for loss of future income, at
83).
48
R v Eckland, 2004 BCPC 298 at para 10, [2004] BCJ no 1747 (QL).
49
CFYI-AM re Focus on the Family (28 June 2001), 99/00-0724 at Appendix A,
online: CBSC <www.cbsc.ca>.
47
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Nova Scotia, 2 from Prince Edward Island, 1 from Saskatchewan, 1 from
New Brunswick, and 1 from the Yukon.50 The areas of law involved are: 355
labour/employment law decisions, including 339 workers’ compensation decisions; 44 tort; 18 criminal; 18 family; 12 insurance; 8 pension and benefit;
5 tax; 3 human rights; and 5 others.51
The frequency with which particular conditions, areas of law, and jurisdictions appear in the results is influenced by various factors. One such factor is the prevalence of the condition in society. For example, a Statistics
Canada study has noted that nearly half of workplace injuries in Canada were
related to “overexertion or strenuous movements and falls.”52 This suggests
one reason why musculoskeletal conditions, which arise largely within labour law, are prevalent in our results.53 In addition, the Statistics Canada
study noted that individuals reporting three or more chronic conditions were
more likely to be injured than others.54 Because these chronic conditions are
sometimes explained in terms of genetic origin, this risk factor also accounts
for some of our results.
The degree to which a condition lends itself to litigation or adjudication
influences the extent to which it appears in reported legal decisions. For example, the legal issues associated with criminal responsibility naturally lend
themselves to consideration of conditions affecting mental health. In our
study, 17 of 19 references to genetic predisposition in criminal law pertained
to mental health conditions (this includes alcoholism and substance abuse).
Finally, variation among Canadian jurisdictions can be explained: a larger
population suggests that more adjudicative decisions will be rendered. Availability of electronically searchable decisions also varies by jurisdiction.
IV. Use of Genetic Predisposition by Area of Law
With the above picture of the decisions as background, we turn to analyzing the role of genetic predisposition in the resolution of legal issues. This
50

See Mykitiuk et al, “The Potential for Misusing”, supra note 24 at 1603.
See ibid at 1601.
52
Statistics Canada, “Study: Work Injuries”, The Daily (Ottawa: 10 July 2007),
online: Statistics Canada <www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/070710/dq070710eng.pdf> at 2.
53
176 references to musculoskeletal conditions occurred in labour law out of 188 total
references to musculoskeletal conditions.
54
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inquiry is best organized by area of law, given the unique legal issues raised
in each, and the differing functions genetic predisposition serves in settling
these respective issues. Each area of law we discuss presents a progressively
more detailed analysis of and reliance on genetic predisposition. We begin
with criminal law and family law, followed finally by personal injury law,
where reference to genetic predisposition often played a major role in determining entitlement to compensation and/or benefits. This essay focuses on
the role of genetic knowledge in legal accounts of causation. While in many
cases it is not clear whether reference to genetic predisposition was dispositive of the outcome, genetic predisposition is nonetheless often employed in
a manner that directly addresses the issue at hand. In this way, whether genetic predisposition is presented as an excerpt of a piece of evidence, a summary of a party’s argument, or the adjudicator’s own line of reasoning (and it
is sometimes difficult to tell which of these accounts for a particular reference), it is useful to analyze the way the concept itself is functioning to make
legal sense of the individual’s condition.
A. Criminal Law
As in other areas of law, criminal law decisions refer to the notion of genetic predisposition as a convenient means of resolving legal issues, and in
doing so tend to ascribe genetic etiology to conditions of unknown origin.
We discuss the two main types of criminal law issues that emerged in our results: criminal responsibility and sentencing. In addition to these two main
types of criminal law issue, there was one criminal law decision that alluded
to the issue of genetic discrimination. We describe this case in order to highlight that the bulk of our results deal with more common, conventional issues
normally associated with criminal law. The 2001 judgment of the Ontario
Court of Justice in R v TT55 resulted from an application by the Crown to
take a DNA sample from a young offender who pleaded guilty to a charge of
robbery. The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown had not
established on a balance of probabilities that the interest of society in the
identification of those who commit offences outweighed the privacy interest
of the accused. Part of the judgment, citing findings of the Ontario Law Reform Commission and the work of American legal scholars, expresses concern that retained DNA samples may be tested in the future for susceptibility
to disease. One such passage states that:

55

(2001), 50 WCB (2d) 467, [2001] OJ no 2936 (QL) (Ont Ct J).
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It is the current policy not to test for genetic predisposition to
diseases, and the current legislation contains significant safeguards. But the fact is that biological material is retained and
kept for future testing according to future policies, which may
change from the current ones. The legislation may also change,
although legislative changes would take longer than policy
changes, especially given potential for charter pitfalls.56

In contrast with this decision, the others did not refer to the privacy implications of DNA sampling or the potential for discrimination.
i. Criminal Responsibility
Seven criminal law decisions cite genetic predisposition to a mental condition in relation to the issue of criminal responsibility. In our discussion,
criminal responsibility includes the inter-related issues of voluntariness of
conduct, the defence of not being criminally responsible by reason of mental
disorder (“NCR-MD”), and the likelihood of recurrence of either of these
types of conduct. In the decisions that follow, genetic predisposition is
framed as a necessary or contributory cause of the accused’s actions, driving
arguments about criminal responsibility. The ability to explain the accused’s
actions in this way facilitates legal decision making in the absence of scientific certainty about the accused’s condition.
The following provides background for appreciating the use of genetic
predisposition in these decisions. One of the requirements to establish criminal responsibility is voluntariness. The Supreme Court of Canada has written
that:
Even before the advent of the Charter, it became a basic concern
of the criminal law that criminal responsibility be ascribed only
to acts that resulted from the choice of a conscious mind and an
autonomous will. In other words, only those persons acting in
the knowledge of what they were doing, with the freedom to
choose, would bear the burden and stigma of criminal responsibility.57

56
57

Ibid at para 32.
R v Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24 at para 34, [2001] 1 SCR 687, 197 DLR (4th) 577.
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The defence of automatism alleges a lack of voluntariness. The majority
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Stone58 stated that:
Two forms of automatism are recognized at law: insane automatism and non-insane automatism. Involuntary action which does
not stem from a disease of the mind gives rise to a claim of noninsane automatism. If successful, a claim of non-insane automatism entitles the accused to an acquittal…
On the other hand, involuntary action which is found, at law, to
result from a disease of the mind gives rise to a claim of insane
automatism. It has long been recognized that insane automatism
is subsumed by the defence of mental disorder, formerly referred
to as the defence of insanity.59

The Criminal Code precludes criminal responsibility where the accused’s
mental disorder “rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature
and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.”60 The
party raising the issue of NCR-MD must prove it on a balance of probabilities.61
The 2005 Ontario Court of Justice decision of R v Luedecke62 uses the
concept of genetic predisposition in distinguishing between these two types
of automatism. In this case, the accused admitted to having sexual contact
with the complainant without her consent. He argued that he engaged in this
conduct while asleep, and that this constituted non-insane automatism. A
psychiatrist specializing in sleep disorders who assessed the accused, testified that he believed the accused did not commit the act consciously because
he was in a state of parasomnia.63 He explained that the likely causes of the
sexual contact occurring while in a state of parasomnia included a genetic
component, stating “there was a genetic predisposition, as both his mother
and brother have had a number of such episodes [sleepwalking]”,64 alongside
triggering factors such as physical activity and exercise, sleep deprivation,
58

[1999] 2 SCR 290, 173 DLR (4th) 66 [cited to SCR].
at paras 157-58.
60
RSC 1985, c C-46.
61
Ibid, ss 16(2)-(3).
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2005 ONCJ 294, 35 CR (6th) 205, 68 WCB (2d) 49.
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64
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alcohol consumption, and stress.65 He also testified that the accused’s condition was not a mental illness in a medical sense.66
Although the judge found that the accused did not have a mental disorder
according to the legal definition, the accused was nevertheless acquitted. In
reaching this conclusion the judge noted that the accused had not engaged in
similar criminal conduct in the past, but rather had experienced similar episodes within consensual relationships.67 The accused was also taking
measures to prevent recurrence of such episodes, suggesting that he would
not pose a “continuing danger” to society.68 The judge avoided characterizing the accused’s condition as an “internal cause” of his conduct (which
would suggest that it amounted to a mental disorder), instead stating that
somnambulism is not well-suited to the “internal cause theory” of mental
disorders.69
The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the trial court’s decision, noting
in particular:
While the cause of parasomnia may not fit within the "external/internal" causal dichotomy described in the case law, Dr.
Shapiro’s evidence establishes that the predisposition for parasomnia, found in some three per cent of the adult population, is
hereditary. A genetic predisposition is the epitome of an internal
cause. Although that disposition does not cause the particular
automatistic event, it does predispose the individual to that condition thereby increasing the risk of recurrence. The trial judge
erred in discounting the significance of this internal cause of the
respondent’s condition. He did so based on a misapprehension
of the "sleepwalking" case law and a failure to consider evidence relevant to the causal inquiry.70

The Court of Appeal directed that a new trial take place on the issue of
whether the respondent’s automatism should lead to an acquittal or a finding
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of NCR-MD. Mr. Luedecke was subsequently found NCR-MD and the Ontario Review Board ordered that Mr. Luedecke be discharged absolutely.71
The legal argument and reference to genetic predisposition in R v Teepell72 is similar to that in R v Luedecke, but was unsuccessful as the accused
was found guilty. The accused had argued he was not conscious while he engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with the complainant. A medical
expert’s explanation of the causes of parasomnia featured genetic predisposition:
For almost all of the cases that have been published, you will
find that there is this unusual ... juxtaposition of someone who
first of all has genetic predisposition to develop sleepwalking,
who then has these factors primed (I call sleep deprivation and
stress priming factors) ... . Then there needs to be an actual trigger ... something has to go bump in the night. It could be a noise,
it could be simply be being pushed. In some individuals, they
snore themselves awake. All of that has to happen simultaneously and the chances of it having happened in the past or in the future are quite remote.
None of the transcripts of the testimony, even Dr. Shapiro’ s report, indicate any significant sleep deprivation or what I would
call acute stress.73

This excerpt suggests that even if there is a genetic predisposition to sleepwalking, an episode of parasomnia may be unlikely to recur.
Risk of recurrence is relevant not only where non-insane automatism is
alleged, but also to the defence of NCR-MD. The association of genetic predisposition with risk of recurrence of conduct relating to the NCR-MD defence was made in two 1999 British Columbia Supreme Court decisions in
the case of R v Campagna.74 The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing the death of two people. The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the
incident. Until about two days before the incident, she had consumed an
71

R v Luedecke, 2010 ONCJ 59, [2010] OJ No 804 (QL) at paras 16-18.
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over-the-counter appetite suppressant which led to her first episode of mania
and psychosis.75 The trial decision relates the testimony of a psychiatrist witness who explained the accused’s mental state as “induced by an over-thecounter appetite suppressant, together with a strong genetic predisposition
towards a mood disorder.”76 Another psychiatrist witness came to a different
conclusion. The judgment states:
Dr. Vath was troubled with the diagnosis that the accused may
have suffered from a true genetic bipolar disease. The accused
had little history of any significant pre-existing symptoms and
the symptoms that she did experience shortly before the date of
the accident had rapidly cleared with treatment and because of
this concern he discussed this case with Dr. David Dunner, an
internationally recognized expert in the area of bipolar disorder.
It was Dr. Dunner’s opinion that even in healthy persons, excessive stimulant substances can induce psychosis and Dr. Dunner
recommended that the accused’s progress be monitored.77

Though the court found the accused NCR-MD without much difficulty,
the cause of the incident came up again at the sentencing hearing. The Crown
argued that the accused should be given a discharge with conditions, citing
one of the psychiatrist witnesses who found:
[T]hat the accused suffered an intense, extreme psychosis, more
likely caused by the latent genetic bipolar disorder rather than
substance induced, confirmed by the fact that this accused exhibited such mental disorder over a considerable period of days
after the incident and that, therefore, the accused ought to be
monitored for some time in the future because there is the possibility of this serious risk of conduct recurring.78

The court disagreed with the Crown’s position and ordered an absolute
discharge, noting that it cannot avoid doing so based on speculation or suspicion alone.79 Earlier in the decision the court cited the testimony Dr. Vath
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gave at trial as having “totally eliminated any such predisposition to bipolar
mood disorder on behalf of the accused.”80
As in Campagna, the language of genetic predisposition bolstered a finding of NCR-MD in the decision of R v Carmichael,81 where the accused was
charged with murdering his 11 year-old son. It appeared that mental illness,
specifically depression, was the only explanation for the act.82 Regarding the
nature of the illness, the judgment stated: “I heard that there is a significant
family history of depression and other mental illnesses, and I heard evidence
of a genetic predisposition to the development of depression. Mr. Carmichael’s twin brother had strikingly similar episodes of depressive illness
which originated in work pressure, which for Mr. Carmichael involved financial pressures as well.”83
A similar but unsuccessful argument involving genetic predisposition
was made in R v Warsing,84 a case involving a young man charged with
murdering two younger step-siblings and attempting to murder his stepmother:
At the present trial, Dr. Wanis testified that the accused had a
genetic predisposition for Bipolar Affective Disorder which often first presents in the late teens. Coupled with significant
stressors relating to the divorce of his biological parents, his inability to attend university, and the pending separation of the
Warsings, this predisposition led to a manic episode. The manic
episode was manifested by an inability to sequence thoughts and
actions, as well as by delusional thinking.
According to Dr. Wanis, the accused, acting on command hallucinations, killed the children thinking that he was saving them
from a divorce experience. In addition, the accused, while still in
a delusional state, then concluded that Mrs. Warsing killed the
children and acted violently towards her. Dr. Wanis opined that
the accused was unable, in the circumstances, to appreciate the

80
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nature and quality of his acts, or their consequences, or that they
were wrong.85

The judge did not ascribe much weight to this testimony, and in the end
found that while the accused had a mental disorder, it did not amount to a defence under s 16(1) of the Criminal Code, because it did not affect his capacity.86 R v Warsing and the preceding cases considering mental disorder are
examples of where an environmental trigger was required for the condition
which caused the criminal action to manifest itself. This construction of genetic predisposition makes sense given the context of these cases, which requires trying to determine the trigger of an accused’s mental state at a given
time. Other legal contexts give rise to different constructions of genetic predisposition.
ii. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Sentencing
Genetic predisposition was cited as both an aggravating and a mitigating
factor in the following two sentencing hearings, though the reasons did not
necessarily make clear connections between genetic predisposition and a sentence. For example, in R v Eckland part of a psychological assessment report
stated that the accused:
[h]as a lengthy history of drug and alcohol abuse, treatment and
relapse. Although he has completed some programs (institutional and community) targeting his anger and controlling behaviour, his habits of threatening and behaving petulantly persist.
He has a penchant for externalizing responsibility, holds grudges, and perceiving himself as mistreated. This is exacerbated by
his drug abuse and a strong genetic predisposition authored by
his father’s side of the family (including mental disorder and violent criminality).87

The reference to genetic predisposition here seems to suggest that the accused would be less likely to respond to rehabilitative efforts and more likely
to repeat offensive behaviour.
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In R v KLM,88 it appears that awareness of a genetic predisposition could
be considered by the courts as a mitigating factor. The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily injury and impaired driving causing
death. The reasons for arriving at the resulting sentence state that:
K.L.M. has the ability and, it appears, the commitment to succeed in her own rehabilitation. She has pursued counselling on
her own. She has abstained from alcohol since the accident. She
recognizes that she may have a genetic predisposition towards
alcoholism. Though her own alcohol issues remain untreated,
she has attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings with her
mother for help in dealing with her father’s alcoholism.89

iii. Conclusions
Though we have not aimed to comprehensively survey the implications
of genetic knowledge in criminal cases, our search results allow us to draw
some initial conclusions. Whereas an American study has noted that defence
lawyers have, largely unsuccessfully, used arguments concerning behavioural genetic predispositions to negate criminal responsibility,90 for example by
arguing that it led to an “overpowering compulsion” which should excuse the
accused from liability,91 our study illustrates that genetic predisposition is being used in a more conventional and flexible manner. It is used in a conventional manner in that it is being cited in connection with common and
unelaborate legal arguments, and in a flexible manner in that its significance
takes shape in consideration of the evidence as a whole. Thus if the totality
of evidence shows that otherwise criminal behaviour was involuntary, a genetic predisposition could suggest an internal cause and support a finding of
NCR-MD. In sentencing, whether in NCR-MD or other cases, the idea of genetic predisposition may be related to likelihood of recurrence. The ultimate
finding of likelihood will depend on various factors, including whether or not
the trigger of an incident is rare and avoidable, and whether the accused is
likely to seek and benefit from treatment.
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B. Family Law
Similar to criminal law, the family law context makes use of particular
arguments involving genetic predisposition in order to resolve legal issues
where a party has a health condition of uncertain origin. The family law decisions we identified included Crown wardship applications, youth protection
orders, contested adoption applications, child custody disputes, and a divorce
proceeding. We begin by discussing Crown wardship and youth protection
decisions, followed by other family law decisions.
i. Crown Wardship and Youth Protection Decisions
The following decisions highlight the flexibility with which genetic predisposition may be employed, sometimes implying poor parenting capabilities and other times adequate capabilities; sometimes serving as an alternate
explanation to an environmental condition; and sometimes interacting with
environmental conditions. In Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v MB,92 an
application for Crown wardship of two children, one of the parenting behaviours warranting the application was that the mother was overfeeding them.
Both parents and one physician witness represented genetic predisposition as
a contributory cause of the children’s obesity, while disagreeing about the
nature of the environmental factor that triggered or exacerbated the condition. The mother denied overfeeding the children and the father only admitted some responsibility on his part, while partly ascribing the condition to
predisposition.93 In contrast, the physician witness reported that “[w]hile other factors including genetic predisposition and mother’s gestational diabetes
may have contributed to the boys’ obesity, there would nevertheless seem to
be convincing evidence that overfeeding was a major contributor to both
boys’ trouble.”94 The court noted that the “inescapable conclusion in this
case is that both children were seriously overfed,” which formed part of the
rationale for the removal of the children from the custody of their parents.
Three other decisions also consider how genetic predisposition, along
with parental conduct inviting scrutiny by child welfare agencies, contributed
to a child’s unhealthy condition. In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Ham-
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148 ACWS (3d) 416, [2006] OJ no 1962 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct J) [Children’s Aid
Society of Ottawa].
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Ibid at para 38.
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ilton-Wentworth v SM,95 evidence showed the child’s father suffered from
anti-social personality disorder and had continuing involvement with the
criminal justice system. One psychiatrist witness reported “T.C.B. [the child]
needs to be protected from exposure to individuals who engage in unlawful
and dishonest activities to hopefully prevent him from engaging in such activities, despite his genetic predisposition and vulnerability.”96 Part of the
court’s conclusion reads: “T.C.B. should have the opportunity to be placed
with an adoptive family who will be responsive to his ongoing needs. It is
likely that he has ADHD and it is also likely that he will at least be susceptible to other difficulties given his difficult genetic background and that fact
that he was born prematurely.”97 Thus the genetic susceptibility of the child
was used as a reason to remove him from circumstances that would trigger
that susceptibility.
A similar argument was made in the case of X (Dans la situation de),98
an interim youth protection application. Here, one of the justifications for
state intervention concerned an episode triggered by the mother’s “lack of
judgment”99 in discussing menstrual hygiene against her daughter’s will:
La psychologue décrit X comme étant une enfant au tempérament anxieux. Il s’agit selon elle d’une jeune fille fragile et insécure. L’enfant aurait, compte tenu du désordre mental dont
souffre chacun de ses parents, des prédispositions génétiques à
développer une maladie mentale. Madame Pothier est d’avis que
le trouble obsessif-compulsif dont souffre X est la conséquence
d’un état de stress post-traumatique qu’elle a subi. Selon les informations qu’elle a obtenues, dont celles provenant des propos
de X, les enseignements de la mère de l’enfant au sujet de
l’hygiène menstruelle est l’élément déclencheur du choc posttraumatique qui a provoqué le T.O.C..La psychologue précise
que l’événement n’est pas en soi porteur de traumatisme mais
c’est l’interprétation qu’en fait l’enfant qui entraîne les répercussions déjà décrites.

95

[2002] OJ no 2760 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct J).
Ibid at para 41.
97
Ibid at para 44.
98
2006 QCCQ 10753, [2006] JQ no 11954 (QL) (Youth Div).
99
“un manque de jugement”, ibid at para 53.
96

2013

U NDERSTANDING THE U SE OF “G ENETIC
P REDISPOSITION ” IN C ANADIAN L EGAL D ECISIONS

27

La psychologue Pothier est catégorique; il est nécessaire que les
contacts de l’enfant et de sa mère soient suspendus tant et aussi
longtemps que la maladie de X ne sera pas parfaitement contrôlée.100

A subsequent decision discussing the same facts also touched on this episode:
À l’occasion du témoignage qu’elle a rendu le 28 mars 2006,
madame Pothier a expliqué qu’elle est d’avis que l’enfant a développé des troubles obsessionnels compulsifs après avoir vécu
un état de stress traumatique. Selon elle, les propos que lui a tenus sa mère au sujet des menstruations sont l’événement traumatique à l’origine de son trouble. Elle ajoute que ce n’est pas
l’événement en soi qui est porteur de traumatisme, mais plutôt
l’interprétation qu’en a faite X. Un peu plus tard, la psychologue
fait également état des prédispositions génétiques qui favorisent
le développement d’une maladie mentale chez X. La psychologue explique qu’un enfant dont les deux parents souffrent de
maladie mentale court 50% de risques de développer lui aussi
une telle maladie. Elle ajoute que la naissance de X, survenue
dans des conditions traumatisantes a pu causer des séquelles à
l’enfant qui ont laissé des empreintes au niveau de son cerveau
et de sa mémoire corporelle. Elle émet l’hypothèse que les événements survenus en octobre 2005 ont pu réveiller la mémoire
corporelle de sa naissance et ainsi déclencher des émotions
fortes.101

100

Ibid at paras 38-39. To paraphrase: The psychologist described X as a child with an
anxious temperament. She behaved like a young, fragile, and insecure girl. The
child, taking account of the mental disorder suffered by each of her parents, has
the genetic predispositions to develop a mental illness. Ms. Pothier’s opinion is
that X suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder as a result of post-traumatic
stress. According to the information she has obtained, including that originating
from X, the mother’s instructions regarding menstrual hygiene were the trigger for
post-traumatic shock that caused the O.C.D. The psychologist specifies that the
event was not in itself cause of the trauma but the child’s interpretation that in fact
led to the impacts already described.
The psychologist Pothier is adamant: it is necessary that the contacts of the child and
her mother are suspended for as long as the disease X is not perfectly under
control.
101
Protection de la jeunesse – 061, 2006 QCCQ 12335 at para 78, [2006] JQ no
13429 (Youth Div). To paraphrase: On the occasion of her testimony on March
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In contrast with the previous decisions, the two following decisions refer
to genetic predisposition as separate from and in opposition to parental conduct. In Manitoulin, which concerned two children, the court noted that
“[c]ontrary to the assertions that were made throughout the proceedings, the
expert opinion is that N.-A.L.’s difficulties were not genetic in origin, but
largely caused by environmental factors. This means that as between ‘nature’
and ‘nurture’, the evidence points to ‘nurture’.”102 The difficulties referred to
include an alleged “genetic predisposition toward either a mood or anxiety
disorder.”103
Likewise, in the decision in RM (Re),104 genetic predisposition was considered a causal explanation of a child’s condition, as an alternative to parental fault. The decision concerned an application by the Crown for permanent
guardianship of two children. In contrast with PL, however, the parent cited
genetic predisposition in denying her adverse impact on one of her children’s
health. The decision states:
With respect to C.P.’s teeth, the pediatric dentist had to perform
four fillings, two extractions, six crowns and one pulpectomy,
which he blamed on insufficient brushing and poor oral hygiene.
When asked about this during their testimony, K.P. responded,
‘You can only do so much. C.P. wanted to brush his teeth by
himself.’ L.M. claims she was told by a professional, ‘Don’t
worry, they are only baby teeth and they will fall out.’ She also
claimed that her children had a genetic predisposition towards
bad teeth.105

28, 2006, Ms. Pothier said she believes the child developed obsessive-compulsive
disorder after experiencing traumatic stress. According to her, the remarks her
mother made about menstruation are the traumatic event causing her disorder. She
adds that it is not the event itself that carries trauma, but rather its interpretation by
X. A little later, the psychologist also reported genetic predispositions that favour
the development of mental illness in X. The psychologist says that children whose
parents suffer from mental illness run a 50% risk of developing such illness. She
added that the birth of X, which occurred in traumatic circumstances, could cause
sequelae in the child that left imprints in her brain and body memory. She
speculates that the events in October 2005 could awaken the body memory of her
birth and thus trigger strong emotions.
102
Supra note 42 at para 13.
103
Ibid.
104
2005 ABPC 222, [2005] WDFL 3793, [2005] AWLD 3085.
105
Ibid at para 13.
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In effect, the mother used genetic predisposition to argue that her child’s
dental condition was likely to develop regardless of her conduct, and that she
should therefore not be seen as responsible for the condition. Due to their
common issues, these Crown wardship and youth protection cases reveal patterns in the way genetic predisposition is used in legal decisions featuring
causal arguments about health conditions. A further variety of uses are observed in other types of family law proceedings.
ii. Other Family Law Decisions
In Marrocco v Marrocco,106 a divorce proceeding, the main issue was
whether the mother of the child (who had custody), could relocate with the
child several hundreds of kilometres away from the father (who had access to
the child). In denying the proposed relocation, the court considered and rejected the argument that the child needed to move because of his allergies.
Genetic predisposition was used to suggest that the child’s allergic condition
would develop and could be relieved in the same manner as his mother’s:
Dr. Krop concludes ‘considering his maternal health history, and
his own genetic predisposition to allergy, and asthma, there is a
strong likelihood that he may develop sensitivities to chemicals
similar to his mother. This is particular likely as he lives in the
same polluted area as his mother’. It is not clear if Dr. Krop took
into account Johnny’s paternal medical history. Mr. Marrocco
says he ‘grew out of’ his own childhood asthma symptoms. Dr.
Krop recommends that Johnny move out of the Windsor area
‘for the same reasons I recommend his mother moving’. In doing so, Dr. Krop seems to equate the mild symptoms of Johnny
with the much more significant symptoms of his mother. Based
upon the degree of Johnny’s symptoms, and notwithstanding the
possibility of future ‘Multiple Chemical Sensitivity’ it seems to
me unlikely Dr. Krop would be recommending that Johnny
needs to move to Muskoka, but for the fact that he thinks Mrs.
Marrocco needs to move there.107

It is noteworthy that this case warranted speculation on the prognosis of
the child’s asthma, whereas many more decisions in our sample required
analysis of past causes of disease.
106
107

161 ACWS (3d) 275, [2007] OJ no 4026 (QL) (Sup Ct (Fam Div)).
Ibid at para 44.
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Further highlighting the variety of ways in which genetic predisposition
can be framed in response to the nature of a claim, two oppositions to adoption applications use the concept in a unique manner. Specifically, the decisions reference not a particular condition, but the totality of conditions,
whether disease-related or neutral traits, that a person may develop. In Nguyen v McGinn,108 the “natural mother”109 of a child opposed the application of
the child’s lawful guardians to adopt her. A psychologist witness reported:
Genetic factors, additionally, are becoming a focus of attention
regarding pre-disposition for various behaviours, ways of interacting and how individuals learn. Although environment still
plays a very important part on how a particular child perceives
the world, these genetic predispositions (nature versus nurture)
are assumed to have greater importance than they did some
years ago. It is my opinion that Natasha’s cultural and genetic
requirements would be most optimally met in her mother’s care.
Residence in a Caucasian home, however loving, would be second best.110

The court found the arguments on both sides approximately equal, but
decided that the “cultural and genetic factors” were “of over-riding importance in this case and dictate the return of the child” to her natural mother,
over a transition period.111
Similarly in DHC v RS,112 the maternal grandmother opposed an adoption
application by the child’s interim guardians. The judgment stated:
While acknowledging that a two-parent family would likely be
in a position to better raise a child, the psychologist believed that
a child would gain higher self-esteem and more complete identity development if raised by its natural parents by being able to
adopt and feel comfortable with racial characteristics and attributes and genetic predispositions including physical appearance

108

(1989), 97 AR 38, 15 ACWS (3d) 432, [1989] AJ no 515 (QL) (Alta QB) [Nguyen
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and medical history similar to its own, a reinforcing feedback
from the child’s total environment.113

In this case the court decided that it was in the child’s best interests to be
adopted by his interim guardians, largely because his grandmother’s household was not a “nurturing, secure environment.”114 The court also noted that
it felt the interim guardians could address any problems of identification the
child may face in the future.115 As in the criminal law cases, the preceding
family law decisions illustrate that ideas of genetics are used within conventional legal argument, and that they will be considered as one among many
factors in the overall decision.
Finally, in transitioning to a discussion of civil law cases where the cause
of a condition is the main issue at hand, and where arguments concerning
genetic factors have a more decisive role, one additional family law case is
instructive. Ivans v Ivans,116 was an uncontested divorce proceeding where
the unsettled issue was entitlement to and quantum of spousal support. The
husband argued that in order to claim support in connection with her disability (schizoaffective disorder), the wife must establish that her disability was
caused by the marriage. The decision states:
In my view, the husband’s argument fails on the basis of the
case law alone. Moreover, in this particular case, it cannot be
said with certainty whether or not there is a causal connection
between the illness and the marriage. The doctor’s evidence was
that there exists in some individuals a genetic predisposition to
this type of illness and the actual manifestation of the illness
may be precipitated by various stressors within the life of the individual at a given time. The early 20’s and the mid-30’s are
particular times of vulnerability. In the present case, the wife’s
illness manifested itself in the early 30’s and at a time when she
was suffering from particular stresses related to the marriage and
the family obligations that she had; notably the move to Ottawa
at the instance of her husband and the terminal illness of her
mother. However, it is not possible to say with certainty that these stresses were the precipitating factor or that the illness would
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not have manifested itself even had she remained a single person. Thus, while there is no certainty that there is a causal connection between the marriage and the illness, conversely there is
no certainty that there is not a connection. This illustrates the
folly of the causal connection test which in many cases is equivalent to trying to answer the age old question ‘Why is a
duck?’.117

While it was uncertain whether the wife’s condition was triggered by the
marriage, the court stated that a causal link was not necessary to merit an
award of support, though it would be one factor to take into account. This is
in contrast to the cases we discuss next, wherein the legal issues to be decided lend much more significance to the causal origins of health conditions.
C. Personal Injury Law
Causation is a major issue in cases involving individuals seeking compensation for injuries they have sustained or diseases they have developed. In
tort law, parties are required to compensate victims only for the consequences of their wrongdoing.118 Similarly, private insurance contracts and various
statutory insurance regimes promise the payment of benefits relating to injuries associated with participation in various activities, such as motor vehicle
use,119 military service,120 or employment.121 In all of these areas where causation is in dispute, courts apply common law principles developed in the tort
law context, to the extent that they have not been specifically overruled by
statute. Workers’ compensation law makes use of some such departures from
the common law, though these are exceptional. It also employs some unique
language in describing concepts analogous to those in the common law. A
basic review of the relevant principles precedes consideration of different accounts of causation in these areas of law.
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i. Relevant Legal Principles
To satisfy the basic test for causation in tort, the plaintiff must establish
that the injury would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s wrongdoing.122 This rule also applies in situations involving injuries with multiple
causes.123 The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that where the “but
for” test is unworkable due to the operation of multiple contributory causes
to the injury, causation is established if the tortious conduct “materially contributed to the occurrence of the injury.”124 The Supreme Court of Canada
has explained:
It is not now necessary, nor has it ever been, for the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant’s negligence was the sole cause of
the injury. There will frequently be a myriad of other background events which were necessary preconditions to the injury
occurring. To borrow an example from Professor Fleming (The
Law of Torts (8th ed. 1992) at p. 193), a “fire ignited in a wastepaper basket is . . . caused not only by the dropping of a lighted
match, but also by the presence of combustible material and oxygen, a failure of the cleaner to empty the basket and so forth”.
As long as a defendant is part of the cause of an injury, the defendant is liable, even though his act alone was not enough to
create the injury. There is no basis for a reduction of liability because of the existence of other preconditions: defendants remain
liable for all injuries caused or contributed to by their negligence.125

This principle has implications for the remedy available to the injured
party. Compensation in tort aims to restore the plaintiff to his or her “original
position.”126 Certain causal factors may render a particular plaintiff more susceptible to injury than others, making return to his or her original position
122
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123
Ibid.
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Lynda M Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Material Contribution to
Justice? Toxic Causation after Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall
LJ 411 at 439, arguing that this formulation of causation has since been rejected
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Nevertheless, because of its influence on the
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more costly to the defendant. The “thin skull” rule “makes the tortfeasor liable for the plaintiff’s injuries even if the injuries are unexpectedly severe owing to a pre-existing condition. The tortfeasor must take the victim as the
tortfeasor finds him or her, and is therefore liable even though the plaintiff’s
losses are more dramatic than they would be for the average person.”127 In
contrast,
The so-called “crumbling skull” rule simply recognizes that the
pre-existing condition was inherent in the plaintiff’s “original
position”. The defendant need not put the plaintiff in a position
better than his or her original position. The defendant is liable
for the injuries caused, even if they are extreme, but need not
compensate the plaintiff for any debilitating effects of the preexisting condition which the plaintiff would have experienced
anyway.128

The formulations of the thin skull and crumbling skull rules both refer to preexisting conditions. While a pre-existing condition may be at issue in either
scenario, the difference is that in a thin skull situation, the pre-existing condition leads to an indivisible injury which the defendant caused.129 An example
is a disc herniation resulting from the combination of a weak back and involvement in two automobile collisions.130 The pre-existing condition (weak
back) and the tortious causes (automobile collisions) are not to be separately
accounted for as they resulted in a single injury (disc herniation). In a crumbling skull situation, the effect of the pre-existing condition is divisible from
the consequences, if any, of the defendant’s conduct.131 A basic example is
where one cause leads to an arm injury, and another a leg injury.132
These principles all apply, with some qualification, in workers’ compensation law. Workers’ compensation exists as an historical compromise between employers and workers. From the worker’s perspective, he or she
gives up the right to sue in tort for full legal damages in return for the ability
to recover compensation through a more streamlined process, without having
to establish that the employer was negligent or to combat various defences
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available to the employer. From the employer’s perspective, certain liabilities
involving employees are replaced by payments to the Injury Fund.133
Notwithstanding the historical compromise, applications for compensation are often met with contention. Because injuries are compensable only if
they are work-related, causation is often in dispute. This is evident in the decisions of the various workers’ compensation appeals tribunals throughout
Canada. Though the appeals process is distinct from that of a court, it contains elements that are analogous to personal injury litigation in tort. Primarily, for entitlement to compensation, causation must be established. Statutes
describe the requirement of work-relatedness in the language of “arising out
of and in the course of employment.”134 Consistent with the tort principle of
material contribution to the occurrence of injury, where multiple causal factors may have contributed to an injury, the condition will be found to be
compensable if the occupational exposure was a “significant” causal or contributory factor.135 Similarly, adjudicators look for significant acceleration,
activation, advancement, or aggravation of a pre-existing condition.136 The
amount of compensation to be received for particular injuries is set out in de-
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765.
134
See e.g. Workers Compensation Act, CCSM c W200, s 4(1); Workplace Safety and
Insurance Act, 1997, SO 1997, c 16, Schedule A, s 13(1) [ON WSIA]. See
similarly Workers’ Compensation Act, SNu 2007, c 15, s 10 and Workers’
Compensation Act, SNWT 2007, c 21, s 10, both of which describe compensable
injuries as “arising out of and during the course of employment”. The Yukon
statute uses “work-related” (Workers’ Compensation Act, SY 2008, c 12, s 4(1)
[YK WCA]).
135
See e.g. Decision no 2003-01384 (9 July 2003), 2003 CanLII 69913, online:
BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca> (using the language of “significant cause” at 6);
Decision no 398/92 (16 June 1992), 1992 CanLII 5812, online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca> (“significant causal factor” at 6); Decision no 1919/09, 2009
ONWSIAT 2661, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca> (“significant contributing
factor” at para 28); Decision no 2007-4682 (19 July 2007), 2007 CanLII 70361,
online: NBWHSCC <www.whscc.nf.ca> (“significant contributing factor” at 5).
136
See e.g. Decision no 2003-04042 (9 December 2003), online: BCWCAT
<www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 09082 (April 2009), online: NLWHSCRD
<whscrd.gov.nl.ca> (“significiant aggravation” at 9).

36

M C G ILL J OURNAL OF L AW AND H EALTH
R EVUE DE DROIT ET S ANTÉ DE M C G ILL

Vol. 7
No. 1

tail in legislation137 and tribunal policy.138 The rules conform to the thin skull
principle in that conditions resulting from individual vulnerabilities or preexisting conditions are generally fully compensable. Where a distinct preexisting condition already affects the worker’s employment, compensation
will only be available to the extent that a subsequent compensable injury
worsens the condition.139
Statutory provisions modify or specify the application of these general
principles in certain circumstances. For example, in most provinces legislation requires that where evidence is approximately equal, the tribunal is to
resolve issues in favour of workers.140 Several other provisions have to do
with occupational diseases, a category of injury for which workers may receive compensation.141 For example, though injuries are generally compensable if occupational factors are significant contributors, Manitoba and Prince
Edward Island legislate a “dominant causation” test with respect to the com-
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See e.g An Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, RSQ, c
A-3.001, Chapter III [An Act respecting industrial accidents].
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pensability of occupational diseases.142 Also, some jurisdictions exclude “ordinary diseases of life” from the scope of occupational diseases.143 This perhaps targets illnesses such as influenza, which (even though they may in fact
be transmitted via a co-worker) are not contracted on account of the nature of
the workplace per se. These diseases have been recognized as occupational
diseases for individuals such as healthcare workers, who face a particular
risk of illness in light of the nature of their work.144 Certain diseases shown to
be more prevalent among workers in particular occupations than in the general population are listed in schedules and appendices as entitling exposed
workers to a presumption of causation.145 In other words, the usual requirement to establish causation is reversed and evidence must affirmatively disprove causation if the employer is to avoid a finding of compensability. A
small number of conditions are deemed to have been caused by certain
workplace exposures. An example from Ontario is asbestosis. If a worker
was involved in mining, milling, or manufacturing involving asbestos fibres,
and later develops asbestosis, the disease will be deemed to have been caused
by the nature of the worker’s employment.146 In these cases no argument on
causation is involved.
A unique issue arising within workers’ compensation is cost relief. Once
initial entitlement to compensation is established, employers may obtain relief if it is found that fully attributing the worker’s injury to that employer’s
account (thereby raising the employer’s insurance premiums), would be unfair or unduly burdensome.147 Benefits paid to the worker would not be fully
attributed to the account of the individual employer. Such relief is available
in various circumstances, including where the injury is partly owing to prior

142

Workers Compensation Act, RSM 1987, c W200, CCSM c W200, s 4(4) [MB
WCA]; PEI WCA, supra note 140, s 3(10).
143
MB WCA, supra note 142, s 1(1) “occupational disease”; YK WCA, supra note
134, s 3(1) “injury”.
144
RSCM II, supra note 139 at 26.03.
145
See e.g. BC WCA, supra note 121, s 6(3), Schedule B; AB WCA, supra note 121, s
24(6); Workers’ Compensation Regulation, Alta Reg 325/2002, Schedule B; ON
WSIA, supra note 134, s 15(3); General, O Reg 175/98, Schedule 3 [General]; An
Act respecting industrial accidents, supra note 137, s 29, Schedule I; NS WCA,
supra note 140, s 12(3); Workers’ Compensation General Regulations, NS Reg
22/96, Appendix B.
146
ON WSIA, supra note 134, s 15(4); General, supra note 145, Schedule 4. See also
NS WCA, supra note 140, s 35.
147
See e.g. AB WCA, supra note 121, ss 91(4), 95, 97.
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employment,148 a disaster or similar event,149 or to a pre-existing condition or
disability.150 Because the thin skull rule precludes apportionment on the basis
of personal makeup or risk factors, this added layer of analysis promotes
fairness to employers while not taking away from recovery by disabled
workers.
Having outlined causation and related issues in the context of personal
injury law, we can proceed to analyzing the decisions. As was done in the
sections pertaining to criminal law and family law, we have sorted examples
by the way in which genetic predisposition is cited in relation to disease causation. Thus, examples vary by whether they tend to support or harm the injured party’s case; genetic predisposition is considered a necessary, sufficient, or contributory151 cause of the injured party’s condition; and having a
genetic predisposition supports or opposes legally significant causation.
Though some statements do not fall neatly within a particular category, many
do. Overall, the decisions support our argument that genetic concepts are a
convenient medico-legal mechanism through which to adjudicate the issue of
causation where medical complexity is at issue. Other details from the cases,
such as who presented the argument featuring genetic predisposition and
how the decision maker considered that argument in reaching an ultimate decision, are also considered where relevant.

148

See e.g. NS WCA, supra note 140, s 18; An Act respecting industrial accidents,
supra note 137, s 328.
149
NL WHSCA, supra note 139, s 116; NB WCA, supra note 139, s 65; An Act
respecting industrial accidents, supra note 137, s 330; ON WSIA, supra note 134,
s 98; SK WCA, supra note 140, s 144; BC WCA, supra note 121, s 39(1)(d).
150
An Act respecting industrial accidents, supra note 137, s 329; Manitoba, Workers
Compensation Board, “Policy Manual: Cost Relief/Cost Transfers” (Winnipeg:
WCB, 2011), online: MWCB <www.wcb.mb.ca/sites/default/files/files/31_05_10
CostReliefCostTransfer.pdf > at s 31.05.10; BC WCA, supra note 121, s 39(1)(e);
Ontario, Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, “Operational Policy Manual:
Second Injury and Enhancement Fund” (Hamilton: WSIB, 2006), online: OWSIB
<www.wsib.on.ca/en/community/WSIB/OPMDetail?vgnextoid=1365fcea9bfc721
0VgnVCM100000449c710aRCRD> [SIEF Policy].
151
That is, the predisposition together with other factors amount to an unnecessary but
sufficient cause for the development of the disease. This type of causal condition
has been described as “an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary
but sufficient condition” or to use the first letters of the italicized words, an “inus
condition” (JL Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1980) at 62).
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ii. Genetic Predisposition as a Contributory or Necessary Cause of
Injury
Several decisions feature references to genetic predisposition that support
an injured party’s case. In many of these statements, genetic predisposition is
presented as a contributory or necessary cause of the individual’s ultimate injury. Accordingly, an environmental factor is also described as part of the
origin of the condition.152 The 2001 tort decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in the Province of British Columbia153 concerned the occurrence of sexual abuse by a
staff member at a residential school. Regarding some of the psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff, a medical expert report was quoted as stating:
I feel that some of his difficulties including symptoms suggestive of PTSD, that is flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive thoughts,
strange experiences etc., as well as his sex-related problems including acting out against young girls are most likely sequelae
of the sexual abuse he suffered during his childhood. His other
problems such as substance abuse could be a combination of a
genetic predisposition, other social or emotional experiences,
and sexual abuse.154

Under cross-examination, the same witness stated that by “looking at
what kind of family he came from and genetic and environmental and social

152

Decisions containing this sort of statement, but which we do not discuss in detail
include: NP c SAAQ (19 April 2005), SAS-Q-096423-0303, 2005 CanLII 70841,
online: TAQ <www.taq.gouv.qc.ca> at para 30; Decision no 737/91 (17 August
1995), [1995] OWCATD no 846 (QL) at para 50, 1995 CanLII 8158, online:
OWSIAT < www.wsiat.on.ca >; Decision no 1358/97 (30 November 1998),
[1998] OWSIATD no 2185 (QL), 1998 CanLII 17325, online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca> at para 61-62; Campbell v Vancouver (City of), 2001 BCSC
350 at para 34, 103 ACWS (3d) 621 (quoting a previous decision not in our
sample); Decision no 321/91 (22 June 1994), [1994] OWCATD no 492 (QL) at
para 23, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>; Decision no 161/04 (18
November 2004), 2004 ONWSIAT 2379 at paras 18, 26, [2004] OWSIATD 2284
(QL), online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca> ; Mitchell v Mason Estate (2002),
117 ACWS (3d) 648, [2002] OJ no 4030 (QL) at para 94 (Ont Sup Ct J); Morgan
v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality of) (2006), 153 ACWS (3d) 749, 44 CCLT
(3d) 198. [2006] OJ no 4951 (QL) at para 348 (Ont Sup Ct J); Decision no 200304042, supra note 136.
153
2001 BCSC 1783, 110 ACWS (3d) 289, [2001] BCTC 1783.
154
Ibid at para 196.
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[factors]”155 he believed the plaintiff was at a high risk of becoming an alcoholic, but also stated that “the combination of sexual abuse and his genetic
vulnerability made things worse for a period of time.”156 Justice Cohen found
the plaintiff’s alcoholism to have resulted from the sexual assaults.157 This
decision shows that viewing genetic predisposition as one aspect of multifactorial disease causation does not preclude the consideration of social and environmental factors alongside genetic traits. The trial decision in favour of
the plaintiff was overturned by the BC Court of Appeal on the basis that it
erred in finding the defendant vicariously liable for the conduct of the individual who committed the sexual assaults.158
This type of causal argument is sometimes described in terms of underlying risk and trigger. In Kolokathis et Industries Maintenance Empire,159 an
injured worker appealed a denial of his claim for recognition of ulcerative
colitis as an occupational injury. The worker alleged that his condition was
caused by medication taken in the course of treating a prior occupational injury. One of the worker’s treating physicians submitted a report to the tribunal, which the tribunal found convincing. The report stated, in part:
Is there a direct causal link between the accident and this man’s
illness? I believe the answer to this question is yes. Mr. Kolokathis probably has a genetic predisposition to ulcerative colitis.
The colitis was triggered off by the medication he was taking for
his pain which included the anti-inflammatory medication
ANSAID. ANSAIDS, and in particular Voltaren, although they
may not be the etiological factor for inflammatory bowel disease, may be the triggering mechanism for the disease process.160

In arriving at a finding of occupational causation, the tribunal cited the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Snell v Farrell, wherein the court
held that the law does not require “certainty” of causation, but only what
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Ibid at para 198.
Ibid at para 197.
157
Ibid at para 255.
158
EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in the Province of British
Columbia, 2003 BCCA 289, 227 DLR (4th) 298, 14 BCLR (4th) 99.
159
Kolokathis, supra note 11.
160
Ibid at para 37.
156
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amounts to a probability of 51%.161 The quoted medical report demonstrates
an example of the way in which medical language concerning causation aids
legal inquiry into “but for” and “material contribution” formulations of causation.
The notions of trigger and underlying risk factors were also employed in
FN c SAAQ.162 In this case, an individual involved in a motor vehicle accident appealed a decision of the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec
refusing to recognize a causal link between the collision and the appellant’s
subsequent development of Type I diabetes. An excerpt of the appellant’s argument concerning his appeal stated:
Ce dommage survient généralement à la suite d’une prédispsition génétique, c’est-à-dire dans le cas ou la personne a reçu, par
hérédité, une susceptibilité de réagir ainsi au niveau de son pancréas. Dans la présente affaire, le violent coup subi à l’abdomen
lors de l’accident a nécessairement entraîné un bris de cellules
bêta considérable, ce qui a précipité l’apparition du diabète. Le
sinistre a donc constitué un facteur précipitant sans lequel le diabète chez la victime ne serait jamais apparu ou, à tout le moins,
ne serait pas apparu à cette époque.163

The Tribunal administratif du Québec, in dismissing the appeal, noted
that no medical evidence was submitted in support of this argument. The appellant stated that his physician had noted the possibility of the relationship,
but refused to write a medical opinion to that effect.164 The panel held that
the appellant had failed to satisfy the required burden of proof on a balance
of probabilities.165

161

Ibid at para 41, citing Snell v Farrell, [1990] 2 SCR 311 at para 34, 72 DLR (4th)
289, 107 NBR (2d) 94.
162
(1 August 2001), SAS-Q-065751-0007, 2001 CanLII 36580, online: TAQ
<www.taq.gouv.qc.ca>.
163
Ibid at para 11. To paraphrase: This damage usually occurs as a result of a genetic
predisposition, that is to say, in the event that the person has inherited a
susceptibility to react in the pancreas. In this case, the violent blow to the abdomen
during the accident has necessarily resulted in a significant beta cell failure, which
precipitated the onset of diabetes. The blaze has been a precipitating factor without
which the victim’s diabetes would never have appeared or, at least, would not
have appeared at that time.
164
Ibid at para 15.
165
Ibid at paras 24-30.
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Other cases also illustrate how decision makers consider genetic predisposition where extensive conflicting evidence is available. In Decision no
935/90,166 the Ontario Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (“WCAT”,
now the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (“WSIAT”)),
dismissed an appeal by a worker claiming entitlement for allegedly having
developed Dupuytren’s contracture167 as a result of working for 34 years as a
bricklayer. A plastic and reconstructive surgeon retained as a witness by the
appellant reported:
In your questions to me, you ask is it probable that contracture
was caused or brought on by performing heavy manual work as
a brick layer for thirty-four years – my response to that would be
that probably this man had a genetic predisposition to develop
Dupuytren’s contracture and that the repeated trauma of his
work aggravated that condition.168

The panel also repeatedly cited the opinion of Dr. R.M. McFarlane, a witness
whom the panel described as “a leading medical expert on Dupuytren’s disease.”169 Dr. McFarlane argued against manual labour as a cause or aggravating factor in the development of the disease. Interestingly, to this end he described the condition as a “genetic disease”, using the concept of genetics to
argue against occupational causation. The panel, taking the argument and evidence together concluded that “on the current state of medical science, the
question of what causes or aggravates Dupuytren’s disease is still unknown.”170 Echoing Snell v Farrell, the panel noted that while the “standard
of proof does not require an ‘exact answer’, a ‘mere speculative possibility’
is not sufficient to find in favour of the worker.”171 Also of interest is what
the panel stated with respect to the uncertainty of the relationship between
manual work and Dupuytren’s:
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(3 April 1995), [1995] OWCATD no 314 (QL), 1995 CanLII 8151, online:
OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca> [cited to QL].
167
Dupuyren’s contracture is a disease marked primarily by the contracture/bending
of some of the fingers toward the palm (see J Vernon Luck, “Dupuytren’s
Contracture: A New Concept of the Pathogenesis Correlated with Surgical
Management” (1959) 41 J Bone Joint Surg Am 635 at 636).
168
Decision no 935/90, supra note 166 at 5.
169
Ibid at 17.
170
Ibid at 1.
171
Ibid at 15.
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Does that oblige the Tribunal to request an exhaustive investigation into the question? We think not. As noted in Decision No.
909 / 90 (1991), 20 W.C.A.T.R. 168, the statutory instruction to
the Tribunal to decide cases on their real merits and justice requires a panel to consider what additional medical or other investigation ought to be pursued before it is confident that it has
sufficient evidence to decide the case. However, the real merits
and justice instruction also requires a panel "to consider when
justice reasonably requires a halt to further investigations and to
the further delays such investigations entail."172

This last excerpt captures the limits of adjudicative inquiry into disease causation. The scope for factual investigation may be even more curtailed in
court, where processes are based on an adversarial rather than an inquisitorial
model of leading evidence and adjudication.173
The above personal injury decisions illustrate that the argument that an
individual has a genetic predisposition to a particular condition may support
his or her case. It can do so by explaining why an environmental exposure
constituting an insufficient cause of disease led to injury in the claimant (but
might not do so in others). A corollary is making the argument that without
demonstrating such a predisposition, the claimant cannot show that his or her
condition is related to the relevant exposure or incident: that is, he or she
cannot establish a vulnerability to an exposure by which other workers are
not typically injured. Notwithstanding the logical plausibility of this claim,
there was only one instance in our search results where it was clearly argued.
In Decision no 484/90,174 the Ontario WCAT decided an appeal from a denial of benefits in connection with an alleged disability owing to an allergy to
smoke and fumes in the workplace. In considering the possibility that the
worker had developed occupational asthma, the majority of the panel summarized the opinion provided by a respirologist:
Dr. Ho reported that there was no evidence of occupational
asthma nor were there any specific respiratory complaints. Dr.
Ho noted that the worker’s chest was entirely clear and that there
were no abnormal findings at all. The doctor indicated that the
worker was not an atopic person (i.e., he did not have a genetic
172

Ibid at 17.
See Gavin MacKenzie, “Breaking the Dichotomy Habit: The Adversary System
and the Ethics of Professionalism” (1996) 9 Can JL & Jur 33 at 45.
174
[1990] OWCATD no 626 (QL), 1990 CanLII 4596, online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca> [cited to QL].
173

44

M C G ILL J OURNAL OF L AW AND H EALTH
R EVUE DE DROIT ET S ANTÉ DE M C G ILL

Vol. 7
No. 1

pre-disposition to become allergic), there were no known allergies and no previous history of asthma.175

Here, the absence of susceptibility was probative in ruling out the existence
of asthma, and therefore, occupational asthma. The majority dismissed the
appeal, writing that “the non-specific nature of the worker’s physical complaints, the possibility of other explanations for those complaints, and the
low concentration of fumes in the workplace do not indicate that the worker
in this case was particularly susceptible to the low threshold exposure.”176
The dissenting panel member would have allowed the appeal based on his or
her weighing of the evidence.177
This type of argument is rarely made, perhaps because it is often more
difficult to disprove the existence of a predisposition than to prove it. Furthermore, as the burden of proof generally lies with the party seeking compensation, it is necessary only to impugn or discredit the claimant’s argument: the defending party need not conclusively resolve medical uncertainties. Finally, if it is clear that the claimant has developed the alleged condition during the period of employment and the main issue is causation, each
party may prefer to focus on which factors triggered the predisposition, rather than on the nature of the predisposition itself. In contrast, if as in the
above example, the predisposition and resulting condition are well-defined
and well-understood, denying the existence of the former may be a viable argument.
A more common argument than denying the existence of increased risk
or vulnerability, made by defendants in tort and employers in workers’ compensation, is that the risk was triggered by non-legally significant causes.178
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Ibid at para 12.
Ibid at para 39.
177
Ibid at para 55.
178
Decisions featuring this type of argument include Decision no 2008-01239 (24
April 2008), 2008 CanLII 25521, online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision
no 320/87 (9 November 1989), [1989] OWCATD no 1013 (QL) at paras 28-29,
1989 CanLII 1936, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>; Haney v Malischewski
(1997), 41 BCLR (3d) 230 at paras 9, 35, 73 ACWS (3d) 247, [1997] BCJ no
1894 (BC SC); Aubin v Tremblay (1991), [1991] BCWLD 2055, [1991] BCJ no
2458 (QL) (BC SC); Bonin et Cargill ltée (21 July 2008), 2008 QCCLP 4192,
online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>; Comeau v Canada (Attorney General),
2005 FC 1648 at para 14, 284 FTR 107, 144 ACWS (3d) 744; Blackwater v Plint,
2001 BCSC 997 at para 711, 93 BCLR (3d) 228, [2001] BCJ no 1446 (QL).
176
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This approach can discredit the claimant’s argument while avoiding the potentially difficult issue of whether or not the claimant had a predisposition to
develop a particular disease. In Williams v Thomas Development (1989)
Corp179 a decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court (Trial
Division), the plaintiff, a cardiologist, alleged she suffered a spinal injury as
a result of a motor vehicle accident. The decision notes an alternate explanation for her injury: “The Defendants have also raised the issue of Dr. Williams being a cardiologist and the continuous wearing of lead coats, either
alone or combined with some genetic predisposition to this type of injury as
other possibilities for the injury.”180 The plaintiff was successful at trial but
this decision was overturned on appeal based on the issues of duty and standard of care.181 That is, one of the defendants was held on appeal not to owe a
duty of care to the plaintiff, and the other was found not to have breached its
duty. As a result, the claim failed and the issue of causation was moot.
Similarly, in Decision no 1919/09,182 a worker sought entitlement for
chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (“COPD”), for which he had the confirmed genetic vulnerability of alpha 1 antitrypsin deficiency. The decision
cited the policy of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (“WSIB”),
which had set occupational dust exposure levels deemed generally to satisfy
the test for occupational causation of COPD. In particular, the WSIB policy
contained a general threshold as well as a lower exposure threshold to recognize that due to the susceptibility of the worker, it would take less occupational exposure to dust to cause disability than it would in another person.
The panel dismissed the worker’s appeal. The decision stated:
We have determined that the worker’s dust exposure was not
sufficient to have been a significant contributing factor in the
progression of his COPD, at any level. The worker has an underlying genetic predisposition to emphysema and a significant
smoking history. His dust exposure does not reach the thresholds
set out in the Board policy or the COPD manual and, in our
view, was insignificant relative to these factors.183
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2006 NLSCTD 44, 254 Nfld & PEIR 61, 146 ACWS (3d) 747.
Ibid at para 28.
181
Williams v Thomas Development (1989) Corp, 2007 NFCA 54, 269 Nfld & PEIR
290, 283 DLR (4th) 273; leave to appeal to SCC refused, Williams v Thomas
Development (1989) Corp, [2007] SCCA no 535 (QL), 2008 CanLII 3200.
182
Supra note 135.
183
Ibid at para 28.
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A similar statement appeared in Decision no 1546/04,184 in which the
Ontario WSIAT denied an appeal of a worker seeking entitlement for a low
back injury that the worker claimed was a result of a fall at work. The panel
did not find the worker to be a credible witness, but rather found that: “The
medical evidence does establish that the worker has degenerative disc disease, including spondylosis and spondylolisthesis, which are consistent with
the normal aging process, a genetic predisposition, and the worker’s clinical
condition of ‘morbid obesity’.”185 This subsection has discussed one major
type of reference to genetic predisposition. The next subsection considers
another way of speaking about genetic predisposition, with different implications for legal decision making.
iii. Genetic Predisposition as an Alternate Cause of Injury
Genetic predisposition in the above personal injury decisions is conceived of as an increase in risk requiring a trigger in order to manifest as a
clinical condition. Being found to have such a predisposition need not harm
an injured individual’s case: in fact, as we have shown, it can be found to
help it. However, in the following examples, having a genetic predisposition
to a condition is equated with a causal argument against entitlement to compensation. In effect, when a participant in the legal process takes for granted
factors such as “the normal aging process”,186 the “normal activity of life”,187
or “the wear and tear of life in general”,188 and omits mention of them, “genetic predisposition” remains the primary causal explanation. Statements
made in various decisions employ genetic predisposition as a sufficient cause
of disease alternate to the legally significant factor.189

184

(19 November 2004), 2004 ONWSIAT 2392, [2004] OWSIATD no 2306 (QL),
online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>.
185
Ibid at para 74.
186
Ibid.
187
Decision no 2008-01428 (14 May 2008), 2008 CanLII 33577, online: BCWCAT
<www.wcat.bc.ca> at p. 4.
188
Decision no 1188/00 (30 April 2001), 2001 ONWSIAT 1460 at para 37, [2001]
OWSIATD no 1435 (QL), online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>.
189
See e.g. Decision no 2005-03494 (30 June 2005), online: BCWCAT
<www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 710/99 (24 January 2001), 2001 ONWSIAT 158
at para 20, [2001] OWSIATD no 233 (QL), online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca>; Dinyer-Fraser v Laurentian Bank, 2005 BCSC 225 at para
138, 28 CCLT (3d) 205, 40 BCLR (4th) 39; Decision no 02213 (June 2002),
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In Polovnikoff v Banks,190 the plaintiff alleged that his injuries resulting
from an automobile collision with the defendants included a traumatic brain
injury and a psychiatric disorder. The decision stated:
The defendants strenuously argued that the symptoms of a brain
injury exhibited by the plaintiff were equally indicative of late
stage alcoholism, a psychotic illness that involved a shared delusion with his father, or a psychotic disorder based on genetic predisposition. In my view, there is no evidence to support the defence theory that the plaintiff’s symptoms stem from a spontaneously appearing psychotic disorder that he was genetically predisposed to.191

The court found in favour of the plaintiff.
In contrast, a similar use of genetic predisposition was successful in Decision no 2008-1082192 of the Appeal Commission for Alberta Workers’
Compensation (“AWCAC”), where a worker had appealed a finding that he
was not entitled to compensation for a back injury. A medical consultant to
the Board reported:
As [first WCB medical consultant] has indicated, disc injuries
and pain do not arise from long-term driving. She has quoted a
study done on identical twins from Finland which indicates that
this is much more likely due to degenerative disc disease rather
02056-02, online: NLWHSCRD <whscrd.gov.nl.ca>; Decision no 2004-02756
(27 May 2004), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 2004-04487
(26 August 2004), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 200300481 (9 May 2003), 2003 CanLII 70178, online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>;
Hall v MacDougall, 2007 BCSC 1296 at para 63, 161 ACWS (3d) 248; Bittante v
Zichy, 2008 BCSC 728 at para 125, 168 ACWS (3d) 791; Bas de Nylon Doris
Ltée et Nicolas Ulysse Bélizaire (19 February 2001), 128525, online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 48; Decision no 2008-01512 (22 May 2008),
online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 2003-02849 (2 October
2003), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 2005-00539 (31
January 2005), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>.
190
2009 BCSC 750, [2009] BCJ no 1128 (QL).
191
Ibid at para 341.
192
Supra note 12. Another decision featuring similar statements, also concerning
degenerative disc disease and involving two of the same panel members is
Decision no 2008-219, 2008 CanLII 86645, online: AWCAC
<www.appealscommission.ab.ca>.
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than occupation. The degenerative disc progression is more likely that of a genetic predisposition rather than from driving
jobs.193

The AWCAC noted that evidence provided by the worker’s physiotherapist
did not provide a causal explanation linking the injury to occupational factors.194 They dismissed the worker’s appeal, preferring the evidence of the
Board’s medical consultants.
Likewise, in Decision no 2004-05655,195 a BC WCAT decision, a worker
appealed a decision denying him entitlement for a right knee injury. The
worker had previously undergone surgery for a left knee condition which
was found to be compensable, and argued unrepresented that “after his meniscal surgery he walked with more weight on his right leg which caused
more strain on the right meniscus and wore out the knee over the years.”196 A
board medical advisor reported, in contrast, that there was “no medical evidence to support that the medial joint arthritis in his left knee was causative
for arthritis in his right knee. The most likely cause of the degenerative arthritis in his right knee was a genetic predisposition.”197 The adjudicator, citing Board policy, held that “a lay judgement should not be preferred to a
medical opinion on a question of medical expertise. As such, I am not prepared to substitute the worker’s understanding of body physics, for the medical opinion of a doctor regarding body bio-mechanics and the most probable
cause of the worker’s right knee degeneration.”198 The appeal was denied.
In the decisions discussed in this sub-section, alleging “genetic predisposition” as a cause suggested that the injured party’s condition would have occurred “but for” the occupational exposure, automobile collision, etc. While
defendants argued that injured parties’ conditions were a result of genetic
predisposition and therefore non-compensable, plaintiffs or claimants denied
the existence of a genetic predisposition.199 For example, in Decision no
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Decision no 2008-1082, supra note 12 at para 23.3.
Ibid at paras 24-25.
195
Supra note 12.
196
Ibid at 3.
197
Ibid at 2.
198
Ibid at 5.
199
See e.g. Decision no 2004-03193 (18 June 2004), online: BCWCAT
<www.wcat.bc.ca> (worker denying he has non-occupational risk factors for
inguinal hernia, including genetic predisposition); Decision no 2004-06212 (25
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2004-02756200 of the BC WCAT, the worker appealed a decision finding that
his current medical issues were not causally related to his prior compensable
claims. A Board medical advisor argued that the worker’s having to undergo
a particular surgical operation “was most likely due to a genetic predisposition to early degenerative disc disease.”201 The decision describes that the
worker argued that his conditions “were work related, and not genetic.”202
The worker was unsuccessful. In DJB v ARB,203 a tort claim arising out of
sexual assaults by the plaintiff’s step-father, one of the plaintiff’s claims was
that her alcohol abuse was a form of injury she experienced as a result of the
defendant’s tortious conduct. The decision describes the testimony of a psychiatrist witness:
In his report, Dr. O’Shaughnessy stated that in general there is
not a good one-to-one correlation between sexual abuse in
childhood and substance abuse in adulthood. He went on to state
that while the area of causality of substance abuse is clearly
clouded, and considering he believed there was no evidence of
genetic predisposition, then based on special circumstances,
namely, had the abuse and the early introduction of alcohol by
the defendant not occurred, it is unlikely the plaintiff would have
developed a substance abuse disorder.204

November 2004), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca> (worker arguing that
mother’s hearing loss, and therefore her own, was not due to a genetic
predisposition); Decision no 2004-02471 (12 May 2004), online: BCWCAT
<www.wcat.bc.ca> (worker’s family physician provides evidence that he is not
aware of any genetic predisposition to osteoarthritis as indicated by the worker’s
history); Decision no 03251 (October 2003), 03298-07, online: NLWHSCRD
<www.gov.nl.ca/whscrd> (in response to the suggestion that genetic
predisposition was a factor in his condition, the worker responded, “[i]t is very
wrong to state this because I did not experience hip problems prior to the injury” at
7); Decision no 347/97 (20 June 1997), 1997 CanLII 14105, online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca> at para 25; Decision no 1203/03 (15 July 2003), 2003
ONWSIAT 1627 at para 43, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>; Decision no
375/01 (28 February 2003), 2003 ONWSIAT 454 at para 34, online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca>.
200
(27 May 2004), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>
201
Ibid at 5.
202
Ibid at 1.
203
(1997), 44 BCLR (3d) 154, 73 ACWS (3d) 785 (SC) [DJB cited to BCLR].
204
Ibid at para 62.
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The court preferred the testimony of the defendant, who did not make any
argument regarding the genetic predisposition of the plaintiff, but rather testified that he did not give the plaintiff alcohol until she was 16 years old, and
by that time “the plaintiff had already been stealing liquor from her parents’
home and drinking it in the back of the classroom with her girlfriends.”205
As in DJB v ARB, claimants sometimes unsuccessfully attempted to deny
the existence of a predisposition. In contrast, several decisions involve the
successful denial of the existence of a predisposition as an alternate cause of
injury. The British Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell v Tenhave206 dealt
with assessment of damages in a motor vehicle accident. A central issue was
whether the plaintiff’s headaches were caused by the accident. A neurologist
witness called by the defendant testified that it was “[e]xtremely unlikely that
the headaches are caused by the accident,”207 though he acknowledged that
“it is possible that the general stress of the accident has acted as a trigger in a
migraine syndrome for which he had a genetic predisposition.”208 Justice
Lander rejected the ambiguous position of this witness, preferring instead the
testimony of two neurologist witnesses called by the plaintiff as well as that
of the plaintiff’s family physician. The judgment states:
When cross-examined by Mr. Considine, Dr. Simpson said he
did not pursue the genetic predisposition aspect of this matter. I
find he did not investigate the family history of Mr. Campbell in
order to determine if in fact there is any such predisposition. I
find as a fact there is no such predisposition on the part of the
plaintiff. Mr. Campbell, the father of the plaintiff, and the medical evidence does not support Dr. Simpson’s conclusion as to a
genetic predisposition on the part of the plaintiff.209

Justice Lander found that the headaches were caused by the accident. In another damages assessment decision, the BC Supreme Court likewise found
the plaintiff’s headaches to have been caused by the motor vehicle accident
at issue rather than by a genetic predisposition. The plaintiff had provided
evidence to the effect that she did not have a family history of headaches.210
205

Ibid at para 65.
[1988] BCJ no 456 (QL) (BC SC).
207
Ibid at 4.
208
Ibid.
209
Ibid.
210
Lindquist v Neufeld, [1984] BCJ no 3076 (QL) at para 11 (BC SC) [Lindquist].
206
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The decision states: “The evidence of the plaintiff rules out the genetic predisposition and I am left to conclude that this was caused by the soft tissue
injury which she suffered.”211
As a final example, in Decision no 09235212 of the Newfoundland and
Labrador Workplace Health, Safety & Compensation Review Division
(“WHSCRD”), a worker appealed a decision granting entitlement for a knee
injury on a proportional basis due to a pre-existing arthritic condition. The
respondent, the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission
argued in part that the worker’s osteoarthritis developed prior to the injury
due to hereditary factors. The adjudicator rejected this argument:
The suggestion that there were hereditary factors is not only highly
subjective, but all so [sic] demonstrably negated by the evidence.
The worker has no genetic predisposition that can be documented
medically throughout her family. The worker’s testimony and the
medical evidence available suggests that any osteoarthritic changes
that happened over a period of time, happened over a long period of
time to the family member in question, i.e. her father and, consequently, more supports the worker’s position than the Commission’s. Consequently, I place no weight on any argument relative to
hereditary factors being related to the osteoarthritis.213

The worker was awarded full benefits without apportionment. As the
above cases have shown, where genetic predisposition itself amounts to an
argument against legally significant causation, it seems more likely to draw
scrutiny than when it simply serves to signify disease susceptibility where
other triggering factors are being debated.
iv. Ambiguous Use of Genetic Predisposition
Considering the preceding examples of personal injury decisions, some
statements reflect tension between the use of genetic predisposition on one
hand as a necessary or contributory cause of disease that can be supportive of
a finding of causation, and on the other hand as a sufficient cause alternate to
the legally significant factor. These more ambiguous references are marked

211

Ibid at para 21.
(December 2009), 09184-07, online: NLWHSCRD <www.gov.nl.ca/whscrd>.
213
Ibid at 16.
212
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by the use of disjunctive conjunctions such as “however”,214 “while”,215
“but”,216 and others.217 As an example of this tension, in Decision no 200300828218 of the BC WCAT, the worker appealed a refusal to increase his
permanent partial disability pension award because his increased levels of
impairment (concerning blood clotting problems) were not related to his prior compensable injuries. The decision recounts:
The disability awards officer asked for an opinion as to whether,
given the above medical and claim history, the worker’s subsequent problems dealing with clotting were directly related to the
accepted deep vein thrombosis, or whether it was more likely
than not related to other non-compensable factors such as genetic predisposition or lifestyle.219

While describing genetic predisposition as a non-compensable factor, the decision goes on to state that:
Although the worker’s family history and lifestyle may in fact
have pre-disposed the worker to blood clotting disorders, the
Board has accepted, as do I, that in the worker’s case, the onset
of his condition was caused by the nature of his employment as
a carpet layer.220

The adjudicator applied this fact in concluding that the deteriorating condition of the worker was compensable and ordered, notably, a recalculation of
214

Decision no 2370/01 (31 January 2002), 2002 ONWSIAT 274 at para 51, online:
OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>; Decision no 2004-01988 (21 April 2004), online:
BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca> at 2.
215
Decision no 1176/05 (16 August 2005), 2005 ONWSIAT 1828 at para 22, online:
OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>; Decision no 651/96 (17 February 1998), 1998
CanLII 15371, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca> at para 20.
216
Decision no 2005-1109, 2005 CanLII 76251 at para 18.3, online: AWCAC
<www.appealscommission.ab.ca>; Decision no 1419/09 (22 July 2009), 2009
ONWSIAT 174 at para 29, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>.
217
See e.g. Decision no 398/92, supra note 135 at para 30; AD v MD, 2000 OTC 52,
94 ACWS (3d) 807 at para 33, [2000] OJ no 248 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct J); Decision
no 134/87 (27 July 1988), 1988 OWCATD no 817 (QL) at para 31, 1988 CanLII
1766, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>; Sparkes-Morgan v Webb (1999),
178 Nfld & PEIR 237 at para 222, 1999 NJ 205 (QL) (Nfld SC (TD)).
218
(5 June 2003), 2003 CanLII 69839, online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>
219
Ibid at 8.
220
Ibid at 10.
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the worker’s permanent partial disability award. Likewise, in Bilodeau et
Service correctionnel du Canada,221 a worker appealed a finding that he had
not suffered an occupational injury causing him to miss work for mental
health reasons. The Commission des lésions professionnelles (“CLP”), allowing his appeal, citing as applicable in the present case the following passage from existing jurisprudence:
Bien que la travailleuse soit porteuse d’une prédisposition génétique à l’anxiété de type panique, elle ne l’aurait sans doute
jamais contractée, n’eussent été des risques particuliers de son
travail. La règle du «thin skull» trouve application même s’il
s’agit ici d’une maladie psychologique.222

This passage demonstrates some ambiguity. On one hand, genetic predisposition can explain an individual’s vulnerability to injury, thereby supporting
his or her claim. On the other hand, the language of “bien que” (although),
suggests that having a genetic predisposition could be an obstacle to recovery
in some cases.
v. Workers’ Compensation Cost Relief Claims
A final use of genetic predisposition in personal injury cases remains
unique to the workers’ compensation process and involves the issue of cost
relief. Specifically, employers attempted to obtain cost relief by arguing that
the worker’s injury resulted from genetic predisposition, which amounted to
a pre-existing condition or disability. The examples below illustrate that the
availability of cost relief is circumscribed in order to strike a balance between making individual employers accountable notwithstanding variation in
the constitution of workers, and not holding a single employer responsible
for the consequences of an injury beyond its control. The concept of genetic
predisposition serves to align individual cases with one of these two competing policy concerns. We highlight the way in which genetic predisposition

221
222

(2 November 2000), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>.
Ibid at para 46. This passage was similarly employed in Nicole Bédard v Cadrin
Fleury Inc (12 January 2001), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at paras 6263. To paraphrase: Although the worker carries a genetic predisposition to anxiety
(panic type), she would never have become ill were it not for the particular risks of
her work. The “thin skull” rule applies even where a psychological illness is at
issue.
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serves this function by outlining cost relief policy and decision making by
province.
In Alberta, a pre-existing condition is defined as “any pathological condition which, based on a confirmed diagnosis or medical judgement, pre-dated
a work-related injury.”223 In other words, it does not include any variation or
deviation from statistical norms or other workers. For cost relief to be granted, the pre-existing condition must be found to have increased the period or
degree of disablement.224 In one decision, a worker who had a family history
of asthma herself developed occupational asthma. The panel decided that
while the worker may have had a predisposition to developing asthma, this
did not constitute a “pathological condition as required in the definition for a
pre-existing condition” and cost relief was not granted.225
The situation in Québec is similar, where the language of “déjà handicapé” or “already handicapped” is used.226 Precedent links this language to
(what is now) the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (“ICF”), and to the concept of disability (fr: déficience),
which is defined as “une perte de substance ou une altération d’une structure
ou d’une fonction psychologique, physiologique ou anatomique et correspond à une déviation par rapport à une norme biomédicale.”227 The tribunal
223

Alberta, Workers’ Compensation Board, “Policy 03-02 Part I: Aggravation of a
Pre-Existing Condition” (Alberta: WCB, 26 November 1996), online: AWCB
<www.wcb.ab.ca/pdfs/public/policy/manual/printable_pdfs/0302_1.pdf> at 1.0.
224
Alberta, Workers’ Compensation Board, “Policy 05-02 Part II - Application 1:
Cost Relief” (Alberta: WCB, 30 November 2010), online: AWCB
<www.wcb.ab.ca/pdfs/public/policy/manual/printable_pdfs/0502_2_app1.pdf> at
1.
225
Decision no 2005-963, 2005 CanLII 76428 at para 26, online: AWCAC
<www.appealscommission.ab.ca>
226
An Act respecting industrial accidents, supra note 137.
227
See Alimentation JA Drolet Inc (8 March 2001), online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 15 [Alimentation] citing Municipalité PetiteRivière Saint-François et CSST Québec (1999), online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>. See also René Matériaux composites Ltée et CSST Chaudière-Appalaches (21 July 2003), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 41
[René Matériaux]; Les Silos Port-Cartier et CSST Côte-Nord (23 December
2003), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 31 [Les Silos Port-Cartier];
Reboitech inc (15 March 2004), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 15
[Reboitech]; CSSS de l’Énergie (26 May 2009), 2009 QCCLP 3609, online:
QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 106 [CSSS]; Entreprises DF (27 April
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may also look at the effect of the disability on the workplace injury, including the nature and severity of the injury, recovery time, initial diagnosis following the injury and medical opinion in general.228 In several decisions, adjudicators found employers construing alleged personal predisposition as a
disability.229 One decision even warned against using questionable “after-thefact” reasoning to conclude that a person’s genetic makeup was defective and
amounted to a disability:
En outre, chaque individu a un bagage génétique qui lui est propre et il serait pour le moins hasardeux, voire dangereux, de conclure que le bagage génétique d’une personne est déficient, simplement parce qu’il a développé telle ou telle pathologie. Une
prédisposition génétique, serait-elle prouvée, ce qui n’est pas le
cas en l’espèce, ne constitue qu’un vague, hypothétique potentiel
qui ne s’actualisera peut-être jamais. Elle ne peut, de ce fait, être
assimilée à une déficience. Un facteur de risque ne constitue pas
une déficience en soi.230

In this decision, cost relief on the basis of a pre-existing disability was
denied where the worker contracted allergic contact dermatitis following
thirty years of intermittent work in forestry. The tribunal held there was not
enough evidence to demonstrate a disability beyond a supposed predisposi-

2010), 2010 QCCLP 3174, online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 51. To
paraphrase the definition: A loss of substance or an alteration of a psychological,
physiological, or anatomical structure or function that corresponds to a deviation
from a biomedical norm.
228
See Alimentation, supra note 227 at para 16 citing Hôpital Général de Montréal
(29 November 1999), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>. See also René
Matériaux, supra note 227 at para 44; Reboitech, supra note 227 at para 18.
229
See e.g. René Matériaux, supra note 227 at para 39, citing several previous
decisions; Camoguid inc (22 April 2010), 2010 QCCLP 3067, online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at para 27; Commission scolaire de la Seigneurie desMille-Iles (23 February 2010), 2010 QCCLP 1590 at para 38, online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>.
230
Reboitech, supra note 227 at para 34. To paraphrase: In addition, each individual
has a genetic background of their own and it would be somewhat risky, even
dangerous, to conclude that the genetic makeup of a person is poor, simply
because he has developed a particular disease. A genetic predisposition, were it
proven, which is not the case here, constitutes only a vague, hypothetical potential
that may never be realized. It cannot, therefore, be treated as a disability. A risk
factor does not constitute a disability in itself.
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tion. This decision (or reasoning) has been followed in other cases involving
dermatitis.231
A symptomatic condition is not required for a pre-existing disability to
be found to exist. Rather, adjudicators seem to be satisfied where medical evidence points to a definable and identifiable condition, even if it is latent. The
prevalence of this condition — or to phrase it inversely — the degree to
which it is a deviation from the biomedical norm, seems to be a key factor in
deciding whether it is a disability. For example, in Alimentation232 90% cost
relief was granted where the worker contracted allergic dermatitis. Evidence
showed the worker was atopic, meaning she had a genetic predisposition to
allergic reactions stated by the employer’s medical expert witness to affect
0.2 to 2% of individuals.233 Other decisions involving atopic workers share
similar outcomes.234 Deviation from the norm also informs the analysis of
other factors, such as recovery time. Employers obtained cost relief in cases
where workers suffered from arthritic conditions and took substantially longer to recover from workplace injuries.235 Deviation from the norm and extended recovery time also led to findings that “mesenchymal syndrome”, a
type of genetic predisposition to tendon injuries, constituted a disability for
the purpose of cost relief.236
In Ontario, the policy on the Second Injury Enhancement Fund (“SIEF”)
states that employers may obtain cost relief where “an accident becomes pro-

231

See e.g. Deniso Lebel inc (7 March 2004), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> at
para 29;
Les Magasins Hart inc (3 November 2005), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>;
Radiateur d’auto Drummond inc (17 September 2009), 2009 QCCLP 6325,
online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>.
232
Supra note 227.
233
Ibid at para 17.
234
Les Silos Port-Cartier, supra note 227; See also Usine Bois Saumon inc (29
January 2009), 2009 QCCLP 590, online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>; Meubles
Laurier ltée (12 March 2009), 2009 QCCLP 1792, online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>; Boulangerie Weston Québec ltée (10 May 2004), online:
QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>.
235
Transport Bourret inc (10 May 2004), online: QCLP <www.clp.gouv.qc.ca>;
CSSS, supra note 227.
236
Finition Chez Soi inc (10 June 2008), 2008 QCCLP 3354, online: QCLP
<www.clp.gouv.qc.ca> ; Entreprises DF, supra note 227.
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longed or enhanced due to a pre-existing condition.”237 Pre-existing condition
is defined broadly as “an underlying or asymptomatic condition which only
becomes manifest post-accident.”238 While the policy states that employers
are not entitled to cost relief where a minor pre-existing condition results in
an accident of major severity, in other circumstances relief is available. The
policy states that the SIEF encourages employers to hire disabled workers.239
In one decision, an Ontario panel concluded that a “pre-existing predisposition” could be considered a pre-existing condition for the purpose of
cost relief.240 In that decision, the adjudicator found that the worker’s atopy
contributed to her development of an allergic reaction to garlic during the
course of her employment at a food processing facility. The adjudicator held
that this was a “minor” pre-existing condition and that the employer was entitled to 50% cost relief. In contrast, another Ontario decision illustrates that
unusually serious consequences following an accident are not sufficient to
warrant cost relief in the absence of evidence showing a particular preexisting condition. In that decision the employer of a worker who developed
cellulitis and necrotizing fasciitis as a result of a minor workplace trauma
was not entitled to cost relief. The panel noted that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the worker had an underlying or asymptomatic condition or a genetic predisposition to either of these conditions.241 The present
section of this paper has canvassed the ways genetic predisposition is cited
and the themes that are apparent when use of the concept is organized by area of law and the legal issue being considered. This paper can now proceed
to considering the broader legal and social issues associated with reference to
genetic predisposition in legal decision making.
V. Genetic Predisposition, Causation, and Disability
To resolve issues relating to disease causation in the face of complexity
and uncertainty, legal decision makers frequently turn to medical and other
scientific evidence. Such evidence often provides probabilistic statements on

237

SIEF Policy, supra note 150.
Ibid.
239
Ibid.
240
Decision no 1094/06 (26 July 2006), 2006 ONWSIAT 1638 at para 13, [2006]
OWSIATD no 1614 (QL), online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>.
241
Decision no 2164/07 (16 October 2007), 2007 ONWSIAT 2599 at para 9, [2007]
OWSIATD no 2604 (QL), online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>.
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association between a risk factor and a disease.242 Yet demonstrating an increase in risk may be insufficient in establishing that the particular party before the court or tribunal in fact developed his or her condition as a result of
the particular exposure in question.243 What is required for a finding of causation in these circumstances is an inference translating or particularizing the
general risk to the injured party seeking relief.244 Evidence that can aid in allowing such an inference to be drawn can include testimony concerning
pathophysiology and possible mechanisms of disease, the claimant’s particular level of exposure to the suspected causal factor, the temporal relationship
between exposure and illness, his or her medical history and risk factors, and
legal procedural considerations such as the credibility of witnesses.245
Our results demonstrate that due to its versatility, the idea of genetic predisposition can conveniently serve to justify the decision to draw this inference or not to do so. The variety of arguments made and conclusions drawn
concerning genetic predisposition varied depending on how they were
framed in relation to the causal issue before the legal decision maker (that is,
as supporting or opposing the legally significant cause, as a necessary, sufficient, or contributory cause of the condition, and either through affirming or
denying the existence of the predisposition). The effectiveness of the argument in resolving causation, in turn, reflected the evidence and argument as a
whole, suggesting that genetic predisposition functions as an explanation of a
conclusion regarding causation more than as a premise or substantive argument supporting that conclusion. Accordingly, decisions rarely turned on de242

See Troyen A Brennan, “Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of
Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation” (1987) 73:3 Cornell L
Rev 469.
243
Daniel A Farber, “Toxic Causation” (1987) 71:5 Minn L Rev 1219 at 1228;
Clifford Fisher, “The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes
in the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System” (2001) 9:1 Buff Envtl LJ 35 at
126. Compare Anita Bernstein, “Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False
Cure for Toxic Exposure” (1997) 97:7 Colum L Rev 2153 at 2166 (for a rare
example of a substance associated with overwhelmingly strong evidence of
causation).
244
See Russell Brown, “The Possibility of ‘Inference Causation’: Inferring Cause-inFact and the Nature of Legal Fact-Finding” (2010) 55:1 McGill LJ 1 at 30-31.
245
See e.g. Katherine Lippel et al, “La preuve de la causalité et l’indemnisation des
lésions attributables au travail répétitif: recontre des science de la santé et du droit”
(1999) 17:1 Windsor YB Access Just 35 at 54-55 (discussing the role of
biomedical knowledge in workers’ compensation cases involving musculoskeletal
injury).
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tailed forays into genetic science. Rather, claimants were generally unsuccessful, for example, where they submitted anecdotal246 or personally researched247 evidence that was contradicted by medical expert testimony.
Likewise, an expert witness was more likely to influence the decision maker
if his or her testimony was specific to the claimant and the disease in question,248 or if his or her qualifications were extensive and relevant to the issues
being discussed.249 In instances where there was limited scientific uncertainty
in need of resolution, fact trumped expert testimony.250 Arguments concerning genetic predisposition were occasionally analyzed in some detail where
family history251 or genetic testing252 were used to substantiate or evaluate
claims.
This leads us to ask the question: what is it about genetic concepts that
make them attractive as a proxy for risk in general? We believe it is a combination of two features. The first is that genetic information, like other forms
of medical information, can link individuals with statistical likelihood of developing a particular disease. Second, genetic concepts derive their utility in
246

See e.g. Decision no 2008-01934 (27 June 2008), 2008 CanLII 43525, online:
BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>;
Decision no 2008-01708 (10 June 2008), 2008 CanLII 43297, online: BCWCAT
<www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 2006-04298 (23 November 2006), online:
BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no 2003-01415 (10 July 2003), 2003
CanLII 69111, online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>.
247
See e.g. Decision no 2006-416 (4 May 2006), 2006 CanLII 78859 at para 28.2,
online: AWCAC <www.appealscommission.ab.ca>; Fernande Proulx et
Pâtisserie Saint-Lambert Ltée (19 September 2003), 207570-62-0305, online:
QCLP <www.clp.gouv.gc.ca> at paras 19-32.
248
See e.g. Decision no 2005-1126 (22 November 2005), 2005 CanLII 76255 at paras
38-39, AWCAC <www.appealscommission.ab.ca>; Decision no 2003-02614-RB
(22 September 2003), online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>; Decision no
1203/03, 2003 ONWSIAT 1627 at paras 43-45, online: OWSIAT
<www.wsiat.on.ca>.
249
See e.g. Succession EM c SAAQ (3 November 2008), 2008 QCTAQ 10901 at paras
46-47, SAS-M-118134-0605, 2008 CanLII 60899, online: TAQ
<www.taq.gouv.qc.ca>; Decision no 2008-00782 (11 March 2008), 2008 CanLII
18365, online: BCWCAT <www.wcat.bc.ca>.
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See e.g. DJB, supra note 203.
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Lindquist, supra note 210; Decision no 09235, supra note 212.
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AP c Régie des rentes du Québec (14 March 2005), SAS-Q-103321-0312, 2005
CanLII 70668, online: TAQ <www.taq.gouv.qc.ca>; Decision no 1121/06, 2007
ONWSIAT 3330, online: OWSIAT <www.wsiat.on.ca>.
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justifying legal inferences from their general usage as an indicator of heredity or innateness. As many traits of individuals correlate to those of their ancestors (and to ethnic groups more generally), pointing to heredity is attractive when other relevant or suspect potential causes do not demonstrate a
connection. In this way, genetic concepts are able to stand in for hidden
causes of disease.253
Framing narratives about health and disease in terms of genetics has particular implications: social and environmental determinants of health and
disability may be downplayed.254 In such cases, responsibility for conditions
is placed with the individuals who have them, and reform efforts, if any are
possible, are relegated to the medical domain.255 This may be said to reflect a
“medical model” of health and disability.256 Disability rights scholars have
advocated a move away from this model toward a “social model”, which is
based on the goals of substantive equality and full participation in society,
and which views social factors as mediating disability.257 The geneticization
of health and disability is analogous to what Parens & Asch describe as synecdoche in the context of her disability rights critique of prenatal genetic
testing. In basing decisions on synecdoche, “a single trait stands in for the
whole, the trait obliterates the whole. With both discrimination and prenatal
diagnosis, nobody finds out about the rest. The tests send the message that
there’s no need to find out about the rest.”258 In Asch’s application of the
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concept, the “part” is the expected disability and the “whole” is the future
child. In the present context, they are, respectively, the genetic makeup of the
individual (or particular variations amounting to a predisposition to a disease) and his or her overall condition or constitution (including social background and environmental exposures). The resulting message is that people
are reducible to their genes.
Shainblum, Sullivan & Frank provide a general example of the way in
which this synecdoche can occur in the context of workers’ compensation.259
Using as their main examples heart disease and back pain, they illustrate that
causation is often more complex and subtle than what the current workers’
compensation framework takes into consideration. In determining entitlement for complex conditions, generic causation language such as “arising out
of employment” provides adjudicators with leeway to determine which conditions should be compensated based on unstated policy considerations.260
For example, the authors explain that workplace stress has a pervasive effect
on health, particularly when accompanied by low a reward (salary), as is disproportionately the case for people of low socioeconomic status.261 The
workplace is also a determinant of social status, which in turn is a determinant of health.262 Yet these systemic and pervasive risk factors are generally
not taken into account in considering occupational disease causation, as they
are instead attributed to the worker’s personal circumstances.263 Furthermore,
our research suggests that notions of genetic predisposition may promote this
reduction of complex causation into a simple matter of work-relatedness,
while downplaying the interaction of social determinants of health with occupational and other factors. Where legal decisions refer to social and other
environmental causal factors alongside genetic predisposition, they may accurately describe the complex interaction between the factors that results in
various health conditions. However, pointing to a predisposition-trigger ac-
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count of causation risks oversimplification, and this is the concern associated
with synecdoche.
Compounding this oversimplification is the tendency of individuals to
geneticize themselves in order to obtain compensation, thereby reinforcing
particular ways of conceptualizing and responding to disability.264 Where being found to have a genetic predisposition harms a party’s claim, such as
where genetic predisposition amounts to a sufficient cause of disease, he or
she may argue against existence of the predisposition. However, in other instances genetic predisposition serves to explain what made a claimant particularly vulnerable to the legally significant trigger of the injury. In these circumstances he or she may rely on the notion of predisposition to bolster the
claim. Similarly, in criminal law, genetic predisposition can serve to support
an accused’s argument of NCR-MD,265 and in family law it can be used by
biological parents and the state to explain the genesis of children’s conditions
in attempting to advocate for their best interests.266
Another implication of these causal arguments relates to the reinforcement of the definition of disability. While in the Boisbriand decision (discussed in the introduction to this paper), it was the claimants who asserted
that they were covered by the definition of disability under the Québec Charter, and their employers who denied that they were disabled, personal injury
decisions essentially demonstrate the reverse pattern. That is, defendants argue that claimants were already disabled, while claimants argue that their
genetic predispositions do not amount to a disability, or at least did not until
they were exposed to the legally significant injuring factor. Similarly, in
workers’ compensation cost relief claims, employers argue that a worker’s
measurable variation associated with a unique sensitivity or long recovery
time amounts to a pre-existing disability warranting cost relief.
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These contrasting arguments can partly be explained by the tendency to
interpret facts in a way that advances one’s legal interests in a given case.
They also reflect the differing conceptions of disability upon which particular policy regimes are built. Briefly, the development of welfare regimes
such as workers’ compensation schemes has relied heavily on medical and
economic measurements, which make use of clinical diagnoses and functional assessments in determining the nature and extent of disability.267 In contrast, instruments based on the sociopolitical model of disability policy look
largely to the limitations of living with particular conditions, real or perceived.268 Viewed in this way, the varied and sometimes opposing genetic
arguments made in legal decisions reveal the “fragmented” basis from which
Canadian disability policy stems, and highlight the opportunity to promote a
more “unified, comprehensive” approach that is clearer about the goals of
and relationships among different disability policies.269
The above concerns regarding the geneticization of health and disease
emerge in our survey of Canadian court and tribunal decisions, unlike incidents of genetic discrimination. There are several interrelated reasons that
may explain why genetic discrimination has not materialized as speculated.
Most importantly, the predictive value of genetic information is limited.270
With the exception of highly penetrant single-gene disease risk markers, such
as the marker for Huntington’s disease, much genetic variation is associated
with only small increases in the risk of contracting particular conditions.271
As a result, the costs and risks associated with adopting a genetic screening
program often outweigh the limited benefits. The costs include running the
tests themselves.272 Other measures of risk of disease, such as blood pressure
or smoking history, also offer predictive value.273 It may therefore be more
267

Lyn Jongbloed, “Disability Policy in Canada: An Overview” (2003) 13 Journal of
Disability Policy Studies 203 at 205.
268
Ibid at 205-07.
269
Ibid at 207.
270
Kakuk, supra note 13 at 326-30; James P Evans et al, “Deflating the Genomic
Bubble” (2011) 331 Science 861 at 861.
271
Kakuk, supra note 13 at 326-28; George Davey Smith et al, “Genetic
Epidemiology and Public Health: Hope, Hype, and Future Prospects” (2005) 366
Lancet 1484 at 1485-88.
272
Humphries, Ridker & Talmud, supra note 8 at 630.
273
Ibid; Ian Kerr & Timothy Caulfield, “Emerging Health Technologies” in Jocelyn
Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and
Policy, 3d ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2007) 509 at 516.

64

M C G ILL J OURNAL OF L AW AND H EALTH
R EVUE DE DROIT ET S ANTÉ DE M C G ILL

Vol. 7
No. 1

costly to turn away prospective employees or insurance policyholders on a
scientifically questionable basis than to accept them, notwithstanding their
genetic profile.274 Also, various organizations have raised concerns about the
use of genetic information in this way.275 Legal decisions such as Boisbriand
and others have set out the general prohibited discrimination test that a court
would apply if a genetic discrimination challenge were to be brought.276 With
respect to insurance, a claim of genetic discrimination would have to take into account that it is socially accepted that the purpose of insurance is to discriminate among individuals and groups based on risk, as long as this is done
in a manner that is “reasonable and bona fide.”277
Recognizing the limits of genetic testing, Péter Kakuk suggests that social representations of genetic information amounting to the geneticization of
health and disability, are more of a concern than genetic discrimination.278
Accordingly, concern over genetic discrimination, which is a form of genetic
exceptionalism in policy, may further reify and overstate the significance of
genetic information.279 Along these lines it is worth considering that the development of genetic science might counteract geneticization if it serves to
highlight the limits of the predictive power and determinative nature of genetic variation. In a related vein, the science of epigenetics (modifications of
the genome outside of DNA sequences) is revealing the effects of environmental influences on gene expression, including intergenerational effects.280
Thus, the development of epigenetics may likewise provide a scientific basis
for highlighting the complexity of the causal implications of genetics.
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Conclusion
Through this study, we have pursued several analytical objectives. Primarily, we have catalogued the types of genetic causal statements made in
Canadian court and tribunal decisions. The range of these statements — in
the relationships they allege among the predisposition in question, the legally
significant cause at issue, and the resulting condition — highlights the convenience of using genetic arguments to resolve legal issues. With an awareness of this versatility, individuals can respond more readily to genetic arguments made by other participants in the legal process. Where such arguments merely express a legal conclusion as to causation, it is helpful to look
beyond the genetic language and focus on the underlying causal arguments.
In some cases it will also be possible to question the scientific validity of alleging that a predisposition exists. Individuals may also choose to direct attention toward the complex interaction of social and environmental causes
that are unacknowledged in notions of genetic predisposition, along the lines
of the analysis undertaken by Shainblum, Sullivan & Frank.281 Doing so may
not affect the outcome of the proceeding, as the court or tribunal must ultimately decide whether on a balance of probabilities the condition is related
to the legally significant cause. Nonetheless, from a policy development perspective, acknowledging the complexity of causal factors of disease can
promote reflection on social determinants of health and disability. It can also
counteract the tendency to geneticize health and disease. Geneticization,
which is reflected in the results of our survey of case law, has consequences
that reach beyond particular legal decisions and affects society at large by
shaping understandings of health and disability, as well as responses to them.
It is this concern that should motivate policy, as much as that of genetic discrimination.
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